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 ABSTRACT 
 
The Adoption of Computer Security: An Analysis of Home Personal Computer 
User Behavior using the Health Belief Model 
 
by 
 
Chester L. Claar, Doctor of Philosophy 
Utah State University, 2011 
 
Major Professor: Dr. Jeffrey Johnson 
Department: Management Information Systems 
 
 The primary purpose of this research was to examine the adoption of computer 
security software in the home computer environment. The use of the Health Belief Model 
as a framework to design a model to examine home user adoption of computer security 
provided the basis for this research.  
 The method of the investigation was a cross-sectional study using a self-reported 
web-based survey to test the theoretical model derived from the Health Belief Model. The 
survey targeted individuals who are responsible for the selection, installation, and 
maintenance of software on their home computers. The data collection relied on a 
snowball sampling technique that recruited a total of 186 participants who completed the 
online survey. 
 The research model contains a total of 26 hypothesized relationships that were 
tested using multiple regression analysis techniques.  The research model contains six 
iv 
 
main predicting variables (perceived vulnerability, perceived severity, perceived benefits, 
perceived barriers, self-efficacy, and cues to action) and four moderating variables (age, 
gender, education, and prior experience of attack). The model explains 30.4% of the 
variance in computer security usage, the dependent variable in the research model.  
 The results demonstrate that certain constructs found in the Health Belief Model 
are more effective than others in motivating individuals to utilize computer security 
software. Specifically, the results show that perceived vulnerability (H1), perceived 
barriers (H4), self-efficacy (H5), and the two-way interactions of age and barriers (H8d), 
education and benefits (H9c), prior experience and perceived severity (H10b), and prior 
experience and self-efficacy (H10e) had significant effects on computer security usage. 
Additionally, prior experience was found to have a significant main effect on the 
dependent variable.  
 Information from this research provides evidence that the Health Belief Model 
can be used to study the computer security usage behavior of home computer users. 
Further, the relationship of perceived vulnerability and computer security usage provides 
a way for practitioners to increase computer security usage behavior through targeted 
media campaigns. 
 
(149 pages) 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The phenomenal growth of the Internet has brought many new and exciting 
opportunities to the home computer user. Shopping, banking, communication with 
friends and relatives, access to sources of information for research and homework, 
entertainment sources, up-to-the-minute weather and news, and countless other possible 
online activities have made the Internet indispensable for most online-enabled 
households.  
 However, while providing these new opportunities for home users, the Internet 
has also provided an opportunity-rich environment for criminals and others with 
malicious intent. They seek to exploit computer users who do not adequately protect 
themselves from the ever-increasing number of cyber threats.  
 In June 2009 the U.S. Census Bureau released the most recent statistics from a 
population survey collected November 2007. These statistics show there are over 72 
million households in the United States with Internet access. Considering that these 
households must have at least one computer connected to the Internet, and sometimes 
more, this equates to at least 72 million potential targets for Internet borne attacks. Using 
computer security solutions available in the form of anti-virus, anti-spyware, and firewall 
software can provide effective protection from these online threats. However, there are 
many home computer users who are not adequately protecting themselves using these 
software solutions (America Online & National Cyber Security Alliance, 2005). 
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 The behavioral antecedents of adoption and use of computer security solutions of 
home computer users is the focus of this research. When examining behavioral 
antecedents, perceived vulnerability in online activities would be an appropriate aspect to 
examine when trying to understand adoption and usage behavior for computer security 
solutions. Additionally, the severity of a security incident to the user is an important user 
perception to examine in an effort to better understand adoption behavior. Focusing this 
research on the individual home computer contributed to a better understanding of 
computer security adoption behavior.  
 
Problem Statement 
 
 The problem is that many home computer users neglect to use even the most basic 
computer security solutions available even with the current threat of numerous types of 
security exploits present in online computing activities. Reasons for this behavior have 
yet to be satisfactorily explained.  
 
Purpose Statement 
 
 The primary purpose of this research was to explore the factors that affect the 
adoption of computer security. No research was found in the Information Systems (IS) 
adoption literature that adequately identifies the factors that affect computer security 
adoption. As a result, this research asserts that current models used in technology 
acceptance research do not adequately reflect the factors affecting acceptance and usage 
of computer security in the home environment. The predominant Management IS 
research models tend to focus on technologies that promote positive outcomes and offer 
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the user some sort of utility. However, computer security software is classified as a 
protective technology, which is strictly designed to avert negative outcomes and offers 
little obvious utility.  
 In an attempt to resolve the absence of adequate MIS models for security 
adoption, this study examined the effectiveness of the constructs found in the Health 
Belief Model, a healthcare model from outside the IS domain. Using the Health Belief 
Model may facilitate better determination of behavioral antecedents that affect the 
acceptance and usage of protective technologies. The Health Belief Model examines the 
protective healthcare measures individuals take to protect themselves from health 
problems and disease. The nature of these health related preventative actions are very 
similar to the use of computer security software, a protective technology that can be used 
to secure the home computer from threats possibly encountered during online computing 
activities.  
 
Conceptual Framework 
 
 The theoretical framework used in this research to study the adoption and usage 
of computer security on home computers is adapted from a behavioral model called the 
Health Belief Model. The Health Belief Model is a natural choice for adaption to this 
study because it examines protective measures in general and is one of the founding 
conceptual frameworks used to study and explain many types of healthcare behavior. The 
Health Belief Model includes explanatory factors not found in IS adoption models that 
this research posits to be important in computer security acceptance and usage. The 
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constructs of perceived susceptibility, perceived severity, and cues to action are also not 
present in the predominant IS adoption models. 
 
Research Objectives 
 
 This research examines the behavioral antecedents involved in adoption and usage 
behavior for computer security on home computers. The two research objectives are: 
1. Explore the relationships between behavioral antecedents and adoption and usage 
of computer security by computer users on their home computers. 
2. Expand the body of knowledge of the information security domain using a 
framework based on the Health Belief Model. 
 
Overview of Dissertation 
 
 This dissertation is divided into six chapters. This introduction provides a general 
overview of the research topic, the research questions, and the document in general. 
 Chapter 2 provides the literature review. This chapter reviews the theoretical and 
empirical literature pertaining to security, information technology adoption, and health 
care behavior research. 
 Chapter 3 presents the theoretical model with specific hypotheses that will be 
tested in this research. The constructs used in the model and hypotheses are developed 
and defined. The constructs used in this research adapted from the Health Belief Model 
include the perceptions of vulnerability, severity, benefits, barriers, and self-efficacy, and 
the motivational construct cues-to-action. The model also includes the demographic 
moderators of gender, age, and education as well as the moderating relationship of prior 
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attack experience. Finally, the dependent variable, security software usage, is taken from 
the security literature. 
 Chapter 4 discusses the survey research methodology used in this study. The 
design of the research is described and the rationale for this approach is presented. 
Additionally, the research constructs are designed and operationalized. 
 Chapter 5 describes the full data collection and survey procedures, the validation 
of the measurement instrument used, and the analysis and results of the study. 
 Chapter 6 discusses the results, conclusions, limitations, and the implications of 
the results of this study for both research and practice. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
This chapter provides a literature review of information security and two research 
domains that are relevant to this study: technology acceptance theories and health 
behavior theories/research.  
Information security is a complex topic. For this research the foundations of the 
need for information security measures on the home PC can be broken down to the areas 
of the threats encountered while on the Internet and the mitigation techniques available to 
protect computing resources from these threats. The first section of this literature review 
will develop these concepts to justify the need for security precautions. 
To capture the conceptual theory of technology acceptance research, an overview 
of the seven most prominent user behavior models was completed. These are the (a) 
Theory of Reasoned Action, (b) Theory of Planned Behavior, (c) Technology Acceptance 
Model, (d) Unified Theory of Acceptance and Usage of Technology, (e) Model of 
Adoption of Technology in Households, (f) Model of PC Utilization, and (g) Innovation 
Diffusion Theory. 
The final research area is based on health behavior research that stems from the 
health care field. Health behavior theory has been used for years to measure the success 
of health promotion measures. This overview covers the conceptual foundation of the two 
theories that have been applied to the MIS domain: The Health Belief Model, which 
provides the foundation for this research, and the Protection Motivation Theory. 
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Information Security 
 
 Internet borne attacks can take many forms. One form is email based, such as 
spam and phishing schemes designed to get users to reveal confidential data. Other attack 
types result in infections, such as computer viruses designed to cause damage. Trojan 
Horses are designed to create back doors or spread viruses or spyware, while computer 
worms are designed to spread themselves as rapidly as possible, creating network 
disruptions. These programs, designed to compromise computers, are collectively 
referred to as “malware.” 
 While some malware programs are designed to immediately cause noticeable 
interference with the normal operations of an infected computer, the more common and 
insidious type of malware is spyware, which silently resides on the host machines to steal 
private data stored on the computer, or to watch and report online activity looking for 
details about bank accounts, credit card numbers, and login and password information for 
a variety of exploitations.  
 Often these malware programs also initiate the host computer into a botnet, a 
network of similarly infected computers all under the control of an unknown individual, 
called a botmaster. Either for their own agendas, or for rent, botmasters can use 
compromised computers (also called zombies) to email spam, gather personal data, store 
and distribute illegal material, attack other computers and networks, or use them to 
launch attacks to cripple the critical infrastructures of nations such as power grids, 
telecommunications, commerce, or government services (Grizzard, Sharma, Nunnery, 
Kang, & Dagon, 2007; Rajab, Zarfoss, Monrose, & Terzis, 2006). 
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 U.S. Strategic Command Chief General James E. Cartwright reported to Congress 
in March 2007 that "America is under widespread attack in cyberspace." During fiscal 
year 2007, the Department of Homeland Security received 37,000 reports of attempted 
breaches on government and private systems, which included 12,986 direct assaults on 
federal agencies and more than 80,000 attempted attacks on Department of Defense 
computer network systems. Most of these attacks were launched using zombie computers 
to mask the true source (Tkacik, 2007). 
 Cyber criminals are continuing to refine their attack methods to remain 
undetected and to create global, cooperative networks to support the ongoing growth of 
criminal activity (Symantec Corporation, 2007). A study by MacAfee Avert Labs 
reported that in the first quarter of 2009 over 12 million new machines worldwide had 
been assimilated into botnets. That equates to an infection rate of 4 million new 
computers infected per month. The United States was responsible for 18% of all newly 
infected machines during that time. Overall, the United States accounts for 35% of all 
zombie machines under the control of spammers. This same study also reported that the 
number of unique viruses found in March 2009 was nearly double that found in any 
month in the previous year. This trend indicates that the threat continues to grow at an 
ever-increasing rate (McAfee Avert Labs, 2009). According to Symantec Corporation, 
these patterns of attack will continue to increase as the financial payoff for compromising 
individual data increases (Symantec Corporation, 2007). 
 The continued success of exploits is directly related to a failure of many computer 
users to adequately protect their systems with available computer security solutions. 
America Online and the National Cyber Security Alliance conducted a survey of Internet 
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users in the United States in order to assess their level of security awareness and good 
practice (America Online & National Cyber Security Alliance, 2005). Study participants 
were interviewed and then computer specialists examined their computers for common 
security issues. Based upon a sample of 329 homes, the study discovered several 
disturbing facts about security measures on respondents’ computers.  
 The AOL/NCSA study revealed that approximately 75% of all respondents feel 
that their computer is very safe from online attack or from viruses. Thus, 84% of 
respondents keep sensitive information on their computer and 72% use their computers 
for sensitive transactions. During the examination of the respondents’ systems by 
computer specialists, it was revealed that 15% had no anti-virus software installed and 
that 67% had not updated it within the previous week. The study also revealed that 19% 
of these computers had an active viral infection and that 63% had been the victims of a 
previous viral infection. The study also discovered that fully 67% of computers had no 
firewall software installed, and 72% of computer with firewalls installed did not have the 
firewall properly configured.  
 With the approximately 72 million households currently on the Internet, the 
percentages of inadequately protected computers represented by the AOL/NCSA study 
equate to tens of millions of vulnerable computers in the United States that are potential 
victims, and attackers, in the online world of the Internet. With the possibility of these 
infected machines being used to disrupt or destroy critical infrastructures and disrupt vital 
services, also known as a cyber-apocalypse, the necessity of determining the factors 
involved in the adoption of computer security solutions becomes clear. Four studies were 
found during a review of existing literature that provided foundational information for 
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this research study using the Health Belief Model. These studies represent efforts to bring 
security research to the level of the individual user. Three of these studies focus on the 
computer user within the organizational setting while the last is the only study found to 
focus on the computer user within the home environment.  
 
Liang and Xue (2009) 
 Liang and Xue (2009) stated, “Avoidance and adoption are two qualitatively 
different phenomena and that technology acceptance theories provide a valuable, but 
incomplete, understanding of users’ IT threat avoidance behavior” (p. 71). Liang and Xue 
(2009) further stated, “Although a number of studies have investigated IT security at the 
organizational level, few efforts have been made to establish an overarching paradigm to 
guide theory development and to provide a common frame of reference at the individual 
user level” (p. 72). They constructed a new theoretical model based on extant literature 
from the fields of psychology, health care, risk analysis, and information systems. Named 
the Technology Threat Avoidance Theory (TTAT), this model attempts to explain 
individual IT users’ threat avoidance behavior. 
 The TTAT contains several core constructs. The TTAT contains a threat appraisal 
and a coping appraisal as antecedents of the coping process, which is problem-focused 
and/or emotion-focused. The two antecedents of perceived threat are perceived 
susceptibility and perceived severity. Perceived susceptibility is the individual’s belief of 
the risk of a security incident actually happening to them. Perceived severity is the 
individual’s perception of the negative consequences of such an occurrence.  
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 The three antecedents of perceived avoidability are perceived effectiveness, 
perceived costs, and self-efficacy.  Perceived effectiveness measures the individual’s 
belief of the ability of the safeguard to avoid the threat. Perceived costs are the 
“individual’s physical and cognitive efforts that are needed to use the safeguarding 
measure such as time, money, inconvenience, and comprehension” (Liang & Xue, 2009, 
p. 82). Self-efficacy is the individual’s confidence in implementing the safeguard 
measure. 
 The coping process can be problem based in which the individual judges whether 
the threat is avoidable, or unavoidable. In situations where the threat is avoidable, a 
problem based coping strategy is employed to undertake safeguarding measures to 
protect information resources. In an unavoidable situation, the individual may use an 
emotion based coping strategy in which they accept the fact that they will be 
compromised by a security threat and choose not to implement a safeguard as doing so 
would be a useless effort. The TTAT can be seen in Figure 1. Presented as a theoretical 
model only, there was no empirical evidence as to the effectiveness of the TTAT to 
explain the individual IT users’ threat avoidance behavior. 
 
Ng, Kankanhalli, & Xu (2009) 
 In a study conducted by Ng, Kankanhalli, and Xu (2009), the researchers used the 
Health Belief Model, adapted from the healthcare literature, to study users' computer 
security behavior. The authors believe that the current predominating models of 
Information Systems adoption represent positive technologies in which there is a tangible 
benefit from the use of the technology of study. They contend that the use of computer 
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Figure 1. Technology Threat Avoidance Theory (Liang & Xue, 2009). 
 
security software represents a protective technology in which the adoption of the 
technology is designed to prevent undesirable consequences. This study makes use of the 
Health Belief Model by drawing on the similarities between preventative healthcare 
behavior and computer security software usage. 
 Core constructs. The model contains six main predictors (perceived 
susceptibility, perceived benefits, perceived barriers, cues to action, general security 
orientation, and self-efficacy) and one moderating variable of perceived severity, and the 
dependent variable of security behavior using email. Perceived susceptibility refers to the 
individual’s perceived risk of a security related incident. Perceived benefits refer to an 
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individual's beliefs regarding the relative effectiveness of an action to reduce the security 
threat. Perceived barriers refer to the cost or inconvenience of taking a recommended 
security precaution. Cues to action are events that instigate the recommended action. 
Examples of triggering events include media reports of new security threats, social 
influence in the form of knowledge of others having security problems, and 
recommendations from experts. General security orientation is the users’ predisposition 
and interest in taking proper security precautions. Self-efficacy is the individual’s self-
confidence in his/her skills or ability in taking recommended security precautions. 
Perceived severity is an individual’s belief concerning the seriousness of being afflicted 
with a particular security problem. The research model used in this study can be seen in 
Figure 2. 
 Results. The model was tested using survey data from 134 employees in an 
organizational setting. The results (R2 = 0.593) show that perceived susceptibility, 
perceived benefits, and self-efficacy are determinants of email related security behavior. 
The results also demonstrate that perceived severity moderates the effects of perceived 
benefits, general security orientation, cues to action, and self-efficacy on security 
behavior. The model used in the Ng, et al. (2009) research differs from the HBM in that 
the construct of general security orientation has been added to the basic HBM model. 
Additionally, the authors modeled perceived severity as a moderating variable when in 
the HBM this construct is modeled as an antecedent of the health related behavior. 
However, results this study demonstrates that the Health Belief Model can be used to 
study computer use behavior in a security context. 
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Figure 2. Ng, Kankanhalli, & Xu Research Model (Ng, et al., 2009). 
 
Boss, 2007 
 In an effort to better understand the individual computer user behavior with 
computer security in an organizational setting, Boss (2007) constructed a research model 
based on organizational control and the fear of crime. The research model examines the 
relationship between the elements of control (specification, evaluation, and reward), risk 
elements and risk antecedents (direct experience, indirect experience, and risk) and 
precautions that can be taken at the individual level which are motivated by 
organizational policies and procedures (Boss, 2007). 
 Core constructs. The research model contains one dependent variable of security 
precautions taken. Perceived manditoriness and risk perceptions comprise the two main 
antecedents of precautions taken. Perceived mandatoriness is the “individuals’ 
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   15 
 
perceptions that that compliance with existing security policies and procedures is 
compulsory within the organization” (p. 74). Mandatoriness has three antecedents of 
specification, evaluation, and reward. Specification “measures the individual perceptions 
of the existence of corporate policies and/or procedures dealing with computer security” 
(p. 68). Evaluation “measures the individual perceptions that managers sift through, 
organize, and analyze collected data to reach a conclusion regarding individual 
compliance with the specified policies and procedures” (p. 69). Reward “measures the 
degree to which individuals feel that they are rewarded for compliance with required 
security policies and procedures” (p. 70). Risk perceptions is defined as “the degree to 
which an individual feels that he is likely to experiencing a cyber-attack and the impact to 
him were it to happen” (p. 75). Risk perception has two antecedents of direct and indirect 
experience with computer related incidents.  The research model can be seen in Figure 3. 
 Results. A field survey was administered in a large organization where 1,738 total 
responses were collected from a population of 3,500. The research model was tested 
using Partial Least Squares (PLS) Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) and the overall 
model results (R2=0.41) support that specifying security policies are effective in 
increasing perceived mandatoriness, which motivates individuals to take security 
precautions. The results also demonstrate that both direct and indirect experience have a 
significant positive effect on perceptions of risk, but risk perceptions do not have any 
effect on the level of precautions taken by individuals (Boss, 2007). 
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Figure 3. Boss Research Model (Boss, 2007). 
 
Conklin, 2006 
 
In a study conducted by Conklin (2006), the primary purpose was to construct a 
model to analyze the computer security usage behavior in the home environment. This 
study represents the first attempt to study this particular segment of the security software 
user population. Conklin (2006) based the research model for this research the Diffusion 
of Innovation (DoI) theory. Conklin (2006) stated, “Diffusion of Innovation Theory (DoI) 
is a broad based, general theory to describe the adoption of new or innovative ideas in 
response to a perceived need of their utility” (p. 18). 
Core constructs. Following the framework outline by Rogers (1975), Conklin’s 
model has five main constructs (Adopter Characteristics, Characteristics of Innovation, 
communications channels, social consequences of adoption, and the adopter decision 
Specification
Evaluation
Reward / Punishment
Direct Experience
Indirect Experience
Perceived 
Manditoriness
Risk Perceptions
Apathy
PrecautionsTaken
CSE
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process). The adoption decision represent the dependent variable in this research and is 
measured as intent to use security software. Adopter characteristics are the individual 
traits that influence a computer users intention with respect to security measures. The 
characteristics that Conklin (2006) measured in this research were the risk tolerance 
based on the type of computer use and risk awareness of the user to potential security 
incidents based on their usage behavior, and the perceived self-efficacy of implementing 
security measures, as well as the general computer self-efficacy perception. Conklin 
(2006) states that, “perceived characteristics of a particular innovation are important to 
the adoption of the innovation Characteristics of the innovation” (p. 62). Conklin (2006) 
measured this construct through the use of the perceived suitability of the recommended 
security solution, the perceived effectiveness of the security solution, and the perceived 
complexity of implementing the recommended security solution. The construct of 
Communication Channels refers to the sources of information individuals are exposed to 
about computer security software. The sources that Conklin used in this construct are 
information from news sources, friends, work, and software/hardware vendors. The 
construct of social consequences of adoption refers to the negative experiences that the 
user has either directly had with security incidents, or has personal knowledge of through 
others that the individual believes are important. The adopter decision process, the 
dependent variable in this study, is measures in the perceived importance of using 
computer security software, and the intent to use computer security software. The 
research model can be seen in Figure 4.  
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Figure 4. Security Diffusion Model (Conklin, 2006) 
 
Results. The population of home computer users was surveyed using an online 
survey distributed using a snowball sampling method. The survey yielded 356 usable 
surveys which were analyzed using a LISREL based SEM method. Results of the study 
indicate that goodness of fit indices for the overall model were within the acceptable 
guidelines. Specifically, the results show that the constructs of suitability, risk awareness, 
perceived importance, vendor based communication channel, and subjective norm were 
identified as important antecedents of computer security usage behavior.  
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Technology Acceptance Research 
 
This section includes an overview of seven prominent behavior research models 
(Theory of Reasoned Action, Theory of Planned Behavior, Technology Acceptance 
Model, Unified Theory of Acceptance and Usage of Technology, Model of Adoption of 
Technology in Households, Model of PC Utilization, Diffusion of Innovation Theory) 
and a selection of the published articles pertaining to these models. 
 
Theory of Reasoned Action 
 
The Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) originates from the field of social 
psychology. Developed by Fishbein & Ajzen in 1975, the theoretical foundation of TRA 
is that behaviors are best indicated by intentions and those intentions are formed jointly 
from the constructs of subjective norms and a person’s attitude (Fishbein and Ajzen, 
1975). In 1988, Sheppard, Hartwich, and Warshaw performed a meta-analysis of TRA 
studies (30 different studies with 11,566 participants) and determined there was strong 
correlation between intentions and actions (Sheppard, Hartwich, & Warshaw, 1988). In 
1989 Davis, Bagozzi, and Warshaw applied TRA to the study of individual acceptance of 
technology and found that the variance explained was largely consistent with previous 
studies using TRA to model behavior (Davis, Bagozzi, & Warshaw, 1989). Other MIS 
researchers have applied the TRA and have also concluded that the TRA effectively 
models behavior in the IS domain (Karahanna, Straub, & Chervany, 1999; Taylor & 
Todd, 1995b). 
 The TRA is based on two core constructs, the attitude towards the behavior and 
the subjective norm. The attitude toward behavior is defined as “an individual’s positive 
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or negative feelings (evaluative affect) about performing the target behavior” (Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 1975, p. 216). The subjective norm construct is based on “the person’s perception 
that most people who are important to him think he should or should not perform the 
behavior in question” (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975, p. 302). These two core constructs are 
both direct influencers of behaviors as shown in Figure 5. 
The TRA is based on one’s attitude toward the behavior combined with the 
perception of those who are important to the person and how these constructs influence 
the end-user behavior. The simplistic, yet effective nature of TRA has provided the 
foundation for models using additional factors to help explain variance in specific cases 
of behavioral research. Extensions of TRA come in many forms and the core constructs 
of TRA can be seen in most predominant MIS models in use today.  
 
 
 
Figure 5. Theory of Reasoned Action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). 
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Theory of Planned Behavior 
 
 The Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) is an extension of the TRA (Ajzen, 1991). 
This extension is through the addition of a construct to represent perceived behavioral 
control on the part of the individual making decisions. This extension is used to increase 
the predictive power of TRA with only a minor decrease in parsimony. This extension is 
to cover issues that account for conditions where users do not have complete control over 
their actions. Therefore, TPB is considered more specific than TRA (Hu & Chau, 1999). 
TPB has been used in numerous studies that have successfully predicted intention and 
subsequent behavior in a wide range of settings (Harrison, Mykytyn, & 
Riemenschneider,1997; Mathieson, 1991; Taylor & Todd, 1995b). The value of 
subjective norm in organizational settings and adoption of IT has been shown to be 
significant (Hartwick & Barki, 1994). In 2005, a study revealed that in some cases TPB 
has accounted for up to 50% of variance of intention (Morris, Venkatesh, & Ackerman, 
2005). 
 The TPB contains several core constructs. The constructs of attitude and intention 
are directly adapted from the TRA. The subjective norm construct of represents the 
degree to which an individual is swayed by their perception of how people they respect 
believe they should act. The construct of perceived behavioral control added in the TPB 
represents the individual’s perception of the level of difficulty the individual perceives is 
associated with the behavior. 
 The addition of subjective norm and perceived behavior control are used to 
account for individual’s beliefs that their actions are not totally under their own control,  
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Figure 6. Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1991).  
 
 
or at least that they will consider other factors outside themselves before making a 
decision (Taylor & Todd, 1995b) Figure 6 illustrates the relationships between the 
constructs. 
 
Technology Acceptance Model 
 
 The Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) was developed by Davis in 1989 to 
predict the acceptance and usage of information technology in work environments 
(Davis, 1989). TAM has been used in a wide variety of studies and has been shown to be 
useful in predicting behavioral intentions with respect to the adoption and usage of 
technology (Al-Gahtani, 2001; Benamati & Rajkumar, 2002; Chau, 1996; Dishaw & 
Strong, 1999; Gefen, Karahanna, & Straub, 2003; Hu & Chau, 1999; Malhotra & 
Galletta, 1999; Moon & Kim, 2001; Rose & Straub, 1998; Straub, Keil, & Brenner, 
1997). The TAM model is heavily cited and is one of the most influential models in IS. 
At the time of this research, 6228 articles had cited the Management Information Systems 
Quarterly (MISQ) article written by Davis in 1989.  
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 Several meta-analysis articles have been published analyzing the TAM model 
(Dennis, Wixom, & Vandenberg, 2001; Ma & Liu, 2004). Ma and Liu found over 100 
empirical articles, from which they selected 26 that matched their criteria for article 
selection. They reviewed articles that contained a correlation coefficient or other statistics 
that could be converted to a correlation coefficient. They concluded that the TAM model 
can be used to predict IT usage but that ease of use is not a strong predictor of intent.  
However, usefulness was shown to predict intent, and ease of use was correlated with 
usefulness. The TAM model has been widely researched and empirically tested across 
many different domains. The main premise of TAM is that the perceived usefulness and 
perceived ease of use of a technology will directly correlate with how technology is 
accepted and used in the work environment. 
 The TAM consists of two constructs: perceived usefulness and perceived ease of 
use. Perceived usefulness is defined as the “degree to which a person believes that using a 
particular system would enhance his or her job performance” (Davis, 1989, p. 320).  
Perceived ease of use is defined as the “degree to which a person believes that using a 
particular system would be free of effort” (Davis, 1989, p. 320). The premise behind the 
TAM model is that a user’s perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use of the 
technology will influence the amount of actual use of technology. The relationship of the 
constructs can be seen in Figure 7. 
 
Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology 
 
 In 2003 Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, and Davis presented a new theory of technology 
acceptance that synthesized previous research, which they named the Unified Theory of  
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Figure 7. Technology Acceptance Model (Davis, 1989). 
 
Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT).  
 
The goal of UTAUT was to build upon the available models in use at the time to 
better explain user intentions to use an IS and subsequent usage behavior. The theory 
holds that four key constructs - performance expectancy, effort expectancy, social 
influence, and facilitating conditions - are direct determinants of usage intention and 
behavior (Venkatesh et al., 2003).  
 Gender, age, experience, and voluntariness of use are hypothesized to mediate the 
impact of the four key constructs on usage intention and behavior (Venkatesh et al., 
2003). The theory was developed through a review and incorporation of the best 
performing constructs of eight models that earlier research had employed to explain IS 
usage behavior (Theory of Reasoned Action, Technology Acceptance Model, 
Motivational Model, Theory of Planned Behavior, a combined Theory of Planned 
Behavior/Technology Acceptance Model, Model of PC Utilization, Diffusion of 
Innovation theory, and Social Cognitive Theory). Empirical validation of the UTAUT 
model through the use of a longitudinal study has shown that significant levels of 
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explained variance (nearly 70%) in usage intention are explained by the model 
(Venkatesh et al., 2003).  
 Core constructs. The UTAUT model contains four antecedents of adoption and 
four moderating variables. The antecedents are facilitating conditions, performance 
expectancy, effort expectancy, and social influence. The factor facilitating conditions is 
associated with items related to organizational and infrastructure elements that support 
adoption. The facilitating conditions construct is similar to the perceived behavioral 
control construct found in the TPB (Azjen, 1991) and the compatibility construct found in 
the Diffusion of Innovation theory (Rogers, 2003). Performance expectancy is related to 
items that would lead to a perceived increase in job or task performance. Foundations of 
performance expectancy include the constructs of perceived usefulness from the TAM 
(Davis, 1989), and relative advantage from the Diffusion of Innovation theory (Rogers, 
2003). Effort expectancy is related to factors that the adopter would perceive as affecting 
ease of use, including perceived ease of use from the TAM (Davis, 1989) and complexity 
from the Diffusion of Innovation theory (Rogers, 2003). Social influence is a construct 
similar to the construct of social norm from the Technology Acceptance Model (Davis, 
1989) and the image construct from the Innovation Diffusion theory (Rogers, 2003). 
These four factors are antecedents to user behaviors, with four additional constructs 
acting as moderators. Figure 8 illustrates the relationship between these constructs and 
the moderating factors (Venkatesh et al., 2003).  
 The moderating factors are gender, age, experience, and voluntariness of use. 
Gender and age are new constructs with respect to previous studies. Experience is related  
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Figure 8. Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (Venkatesh et al., 2003). 
 
to self-efficacy and originates in Social Cognitive Theory (Compeau & Higgins, 1995). 
Voluntariness of use of the technology is a construct that reflects the amount of choice 
the user of the technology has in its adoption. Voluntariness has been shown to account 
for some influence in overall usage (Hartwick & Barki, 1994; Rogers, 2003). 
 Previous research. The Unified Theory of Acceptance and Usage of 
Technology seminal article has been cited by many other researchers since it was 
introduced in 2003. Currently UTAUT has been cited by over 1,800 other articles. 
Research domains that have applied the UTAUT model include acceptance of assistive 
robots (Heerink,  Krose, Evers, & Wielinga, 2006), computer security usage (Appunn, 
2008), ERP implementations (Tao, Lee, & Liu, 2005), mobile devices (Carlsson, 
Carlsson, Hyvönen, Puhakainen, & Walden, 2006; Ristola, Koivumaki, & Kesti, 2005), 
organizational learning in health systems (Doktor, Bangert, & Valdez, 2005), online 
banking (Al-Somali, Gholami, & Clegg, 2009; Cheng, Liu, Qian, & Song, 2008; Liu, 
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Huang, & Zhu, 2008), personal innovativeness (Rosen, 2004), usage of web systems (Li 
& Kishore, 2006; Wang & Yang, 2005), and wireless communications (Anderson & 
Schwager, 2004; Han, Mustonen, Seppanen, & Kallio, 2005; Knutsen, 2005; Lin, Chan, 
& Jin, 2004). 
 
Model of Adoption of Technology in Households 
 
 Created in 2001 by Venkatesh and Brown, the Model of Adoption of Technology 
in Households (MATH) represents a major shift for MIS research. Up to this point 
research on technology adoption had been focused on organizations, or on individuals 
within organizations. However, this recent exploration of technology adoption in 
households was studied using personal computer adoption within the home (Venkatesh & 
Brown, 2001).  
 Core constructs. The research model used in this study grouped the antecedents 
to behavioral intent in three groups: attitudinal beliefs, normative beliefs, and control 
beliefs. In the group of attitudinal beliefs are the antecedents of application for personal 
use, utility for children, utility for work-related use, applications for fun, and social 
outcomes. In normative beliefs, the constructs are friends and family influences, 
secondary sources’ influences, and workplace referents’ influences. Control beliefs 
included fear of technological advances, declining cost, perceived ease of use, and 
requisite knowledge. The MATH was later extended to add Household Life Cycle by the 
original researchers (Brown & Venkatesh, 2005; Brown, Venkatesh, & Bala, 2006 ). A 
representation of the constructs and their relationships can be found in Figure 9.  
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 Previous research. The Model of Adoption of Technology in Households 
represents a relatively new adoption model and therefore not much research has been 
conducted using the MATH model as a foundation. While the recency of the model may 
account for a significant lack of follow-up research, there are more recent models with 
much higher acceptance and usage. The focus on the adoption of technology in the home, 
which until this study was largely ignored, remains an area of little interest to most 
researchers. As such, this article has only been cited approximately 260 times.  
 A review of these articles has revealed that this research has been used to support 
the concepts of hedonistic outcomes (Tractinsky, 2004), fear of obsolescence (Choi, 
Choi, Kim, & Yu, 2005; Porter & Donthu, 2006), appreciation of associated benefits 
(Anckar, Carlsson, & Walden, 2003) and in reviews of existing theories, as an extension 
to the Theory of Planned Behavior (Dewan & Riggins, 2005). 
 This model is being included in this literature review as it is the first major effort 
to analyze the adoption of technology in the household. While not a major influencer in 
current MIS research, it provides the first recognition that technology adoption research 
in the home is a viable and valuable research area to explore.  
 
Model of PC Utilization 
 
 The model of PC utilization (MPCU) was developed by Thompson, Higgins, and 
Howell in 1991. This model was derived largely from the Theory of Human Behavior 
(Triandis, 1980). The MPCU presents a competing perspective to that proposed by TRA 
and TPB. Thompson et al. (1991) adapted and refined Triandis’ model for IS contexts 
and used the model to predict PC utilization. However, the nature of the model makes it  
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Figure 9. Model of Adoption of Technology in Households (Brown & Venkatesh, 2005) 
 
 
particularly suited to predict individual acceptance and use of a range of information 
technologies (Venkatesh, et al., 2003). 
 Core constructs. The model measures actual usage instead of intention, and 
consists of six independent variables (Job-fit, Complexity, Long-term Consequences, 
Affect Towards Use, Social Factors, and Facilitating Conditions) and one dependent 
variable (actual use) (Thompson et al., 1991). Job-fit is defined as “the extent to which an 
individual believes that using [a technology] can enhance the performance of his or her 
job” (Thompson et al., 1991, p. 129). Complexity is based on Rogers and Shoemaker 
(1971) and is defined as “the degree to which an innovation is perceived as relatively 
difficult to understand and use” (Thompson et al., 1991, p. 128). Long-term 
Consequences is defined as “outcomes that have a pay-off in the future” (Thompson et 
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al., 1991, p. 129). Affect toward use is based on Triandis (1980) and is defined as 
“feelings of joy, elation, or pleasure, or depression, disgust, displeasure, or hate 
associated by an individual with a particular act” (Thompson et al., 1991, p. 127). Social 
Factors is also derived from Triandis (1980) and are defined as “the individual’s 
internalization of the reference group’s subjective culture, and specific interpersonal 
agreements that the individual has made with others, in specific social situations” 
(Thompson et al., 1991, p. 126). Facilitating Conditions are objective factors in the 
environment that observers agree make an act easy to accomplish.  Thompson et al. 
defines facilitating conditions as “provision of support for users of PCs may be one type 
of facilitating condition that can influence system utilization” (Thompson et al., 1991, p. 
129). A pictorial representation is illustrated in Figure 10. 
 Previous research. The MPCU model has been cited 598 times, which shows 
that it has been used by many researchers. Most notably the MPCU was one of the 
founding models used in the Unified Theory of Acceptance and Usage of Technology 
(Venkatesh et al., 2003).  
 
 
 
Figure 10. Model of PC Utilization (Thompson et al., 1991). 
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 Examples of research that has applied the MPCU include computer self-efficacy 
(Compeau & Higgins, 1995), perceived ease of use (Gefen & Straub, 2000; Karahanna & 
Struab, 1999; Venkatesh, 2000), the role of prior experience (Taylor & Todd, 1995a), 
electronic markets (Liang & Huang, 1998), personal computer utilization (Thompson, 
Higgins, & Howell, 1994), technology use and performance (Lucas & Spitler, 1999), and 
the Technology Acceptance Model (Lee, Kozar, & Larsen, 2003). 
 
Diffusion of Innovation Theory 
 
 Originally created by Everett Rogers in 1964 and based on extant theories in 
sociology and communications, the Diffusion of Innovation theory has been used for over 
40 years to study a variety of innovations from different fields (Rogers, 2003). Diffusion 
of Innovation theory describes how an innovation is communicated over time to potential 
adopters. Diffusion of Innovation theory was developed to explain the factors that 
influence adopters with respect to adoption of a specific innovation. Innovations 
represent something new, such as a new tool, a new method, or some other change 
perceived as valuable or useful to the adopter. Diffusion is a communication process 
where information about an innovation is communicated over a period of time across a 
social system. Individual adopters, using the information, can make a decision whether or 
not to adopt the innovation (Rogers, 2003). 
 Core constructs. Rogers described five elements that characterize diffusion 
(Rogers, 2003). One construct of the DoI theory is the innovation, which is defined as 
something that is perceived as new or different to the adopter (Rogers, 2003). Another 
construct of the DoI theory is the decision making process that occurs when individuals 
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consider a new idea. The potential adopter weighs the advantages and disadvantages of 
using the innovation and decides whether to adopt or reject the innovation. The third 
construct of the DoI theory is the characteristics of individuals that make them likely to 
adopt an innovation. Not all adopters will adopt technology at the same rate, or at all. 
While some people readily adopt innovations, others adopt them more slowly and some 
adopt only if forced to do so. Rogers has described five classes of adopters; innovators, 
early adopters, early majority, late majority, and laggards (Rogers, 2003). The fourth 
construct of the DoI theory is the consequences for individuals and society associated 
with adopting an innovation. This can be defined as the consequences resulting from 
failure. The last construct of the DoI theory is the communication channels used in the 
adoption process. This construct is defined by the social communication networks 
involved in the adoption process. These networks are used to spread information between 
potential adopters from a wide variety of sources. Figure 11 illustrates the relationship 
between these constructs.  
 Previous research. One of the primary strengths of the DoI theory is its broad 
applicability across numerous disciplines and innovations. In 1996, research by Moore 
and Benbasat demonstrated support for the predictive value of the DoI framework in 
informations systems research (Moore & Benbasat, 1991). Additional researchers have 
demonstrated the applicability of DoI to individual adoption in IS (Agarwal & Prasad 
1997, 1998; Karahanna, et al., 1999; Plouffe, Hulland,  & Vandenbosch, 2001). 
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Figure 11. Diffusion of Innovation Theory (Rogers, 1995). 
 
Summary – Technology Adoption Research 
The current predominant models in IS used to examine user adoption and usage 
behavior are the Theory of Reasoned Action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), the Theory of 
Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1991), the Technology Acceptance Model (Davis, 1989), the 
Unified Theory of Acceptance and Usage of Technology (Venkatesh et al., 2003), the 
Model of Adoption of Technology in Households (Brown & Venkatesh, 2005), the 
Model of PC utilization (Thompson et al., 1991), and the Innovation Diffusion Theory 
(Rogers, 2003). These MIS research models tend to focus on technologies that promote 
positive outcomes and offer the user some sort of utility. However, computer security 
software is classified as a protective technology, which is strictly designed to avert 
negative outcomes and offers little obvious utility (Conklin, 2006; Ng et al., 2009). None 
of these models address the problem of adoption when utilized for reason of protection, 
rather than utility. 
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Health Behavior Research 
 
This section includes an overview of two prominent health behavior research 
models (Health Belief Model and the Protection Motivation Theory) and a review of the 
published articles pertaining to these models. 
 
Health Belief Model 
 
The Health Belief Model (HBM) is a psychological model that attempts to explain 
and predict protective health behaviors. This is done by focusing on the attitudes and 
beliefs of individuals. The HBM was first developed in the 1950s by social psychologists 
Hochbaum, Rosenstock, and Kegels, working in the U.S. Public Health Services 
(Hochbaum, 1958). The model was developed in response to the failure of a free 
tuberculosis health-screening program. Since then, the HBM has been adapted to explore 
a variety of long- and short-term health behaviors. The HBM is based on the 
understanding that a person will take a health-related action if that person feels that a 
negative health condition can be avoided, has a positive expectation that by taking a 
recommended action they will avoid a negative health condition, and believes that they 
can successfully take a recommended health action (Rosenstock, 1974). 
 The original HBM contained four core constructs representing the perceived 
threat and net benefits: perceived susceptibility, perceived severity, perceived benefits, 
and perceived barriers. These concepts were proposed as accounting for people's 
"readiness to act." An additional concept, cues to action, would trigger that readiness and 
stimulate behavior (Rosenstock, 1966, 1974). An addition to the HBM in 1988 by 
Rosenstock, Strecher, and Becker is the perceptual concept of self-efficacy, which is 
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one's confidence in the ability to successfully perform an action (Bandura, 1977). The 
core constructs of the HBM are outlined below. 
 Perceived susceptibility. Personal risk or susceptibility is one of the more 
compelling perceptions in motivating people to adopt healthier behaviors. The greater the 
perceived risk, the greater the likelihood of engaging in behaviors to decrease the risk.  
 Perceived seriousness. The construct of perceived seriousness is defined as an 
individual’s belief about the seriousness or severity of a disease. While the perception of 
seriousness is often based on medical information or knowledge, it may also come from 
beliefs the person has about the difficulties a disease would create or the effects it would 
have on his or her life in general. 
 Perceived benefits. The construct of perceived benefits is a person’s perception 
of usefulness of a new behavior in decreasing the risk of developing a disease. People 
tend to adopt healthier behaviors when they believe the new behavior will decrease their 
chances of developing a disease (Rosenstock, 1966). 
 Perceived barriers. The construct of perceived barriers is an individual’s 
perception of the obstacles in the way of adopting a new behavior. Janz and Becker 
suggested in 1984 that of all HBM constructs, perceived barriers are the most significant 
in determining behavior change (Janz & Becker, 1984). 
 Self-efficacy. In 1988, self-efficacy was added to the original four perceptual 
constructs of the HBM (Rosenstock, Strecher, & Becker, 1988). Self-efficacy is the belief 
in one’s own ability to do something (Bandura, 1977). People generally do not attempt 
something new unless they perceive a fair chance of success.  
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 Cues to action. In addition to the five beliefs or perceptions, the HBM suggests 
that behavior is also influenced by cues to action. Cues to action are events, people, or 
things that move people to change their behavior. Examples include illness of a family 
member, media reports (Graham, 2002), symptoms of illness, advice from others, 
reminder postcards from a health provider (Ali, 2002), or health warning labels on a 
product. 
 Modifying variables. The five major constructs of perception (susceptibility, 
seriousness, benefits, barriers, and self efficacy) are modified by other variables that have 
been labeled socio-demographic factors. These include demographic variables (gender, 
age, education level, income, race, ethnicity, etc.), socio-psychological variables 
(personality, social class, peer and reference group pressure, etc), and structural variables 
(knowledge about the disease, prior contact with the disease, etc.). These variables 
represent individual characteristics that influence personal perceptions. A visual 
representation of the Health Belief Model is in Figure 12. 
 Previous research. The HBM has been used in numerous research studies 
covering a variety of medical conditions, detection screenings, and prevention 
techniques. Examples of research using the HBM can be found in research relating to 
HIV, AIDS, and sexually transmitted disease prevention (Belcher, Sternberg, Wolotski, 
Halkitis, & Hoff, 2005; Lewis & Malow, 1997; Rose, 1995; Yep, 1993), various cancers, 
(Burak & Meyer, 1997; Byrd, Peterson, Chavez, & Heckert, 2004; Champion, 1993; 
Champion & Menon, 1997; Ellingson & Yarber, 1997; Frank, Swedmark, & Grubbs, 
2004; Graham, 2002; Lamanna, 2004; Mullens, McCaul, Erickson, & Sandgren, 2003; 
Umeh & Rogan-Gibson, 2001; Weinrich et al.,1998), diabetes (Forsyth & Goetsch,  
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Figure 12. Health Belief Model (Rosenstock, Strecher, & Becker, 1994)  
 
1997), heart disease (Ali, 2002), and vaccinations (Chen, Fox, Cantrell, Stockdale, & 
Kagawa-Singer, 2007; de Wit, Vet, Schutten, & van Steenbergen, 2005). 
 In the area of IS research, only one study using the HBM was found. However, 
the model used in this study was modified from the original HBM as it did not include 
the modifying socio-demographic variables of gender age, ethnicity, etc. Additionally, 
the perceived seriousness (perceived severity) construct was used as a moderator on the 
other constructs (Ng, Kankanhalli, & Xu, 2009). In the HBM, perceived seriousness was 
modeled as a main predictor of behavior and not as a modifying construct. 
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Protection Motivation Theory 
 The Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) was originally proposed to provide 
conceptual clarity to the understanding of fear appeals (Rogers, 1975). A later revision of 
PMT extended the theory to a more general theory of persuasive communication, with an 
emphasis on the cognitive processes mediating behavioral change (Rogers, 1983). 
 The PMT is partially based on the work of Lazarus (1966) and Leventhal (1970) 
and describes adaptive and maladaptive coping with a health threat as a result of a threat 
appraisal and a coping appraisal, in which the behavioral options to diminish the threat 
are evaluated (Boer & Seydel, 1996). The appraisal of the health threat, and the appraisal 
of the coping responses, result in protection motivation, which is the intention to perform 
adaptive responses, or may lead to maladaptive responses, which are those that place an 
individual at health risk. They include behaviors that lead to negative consequences and 
the absence of behaviors, which eventually may lead to negative consequences. Since the 
output of these appraisal-mediating processes is the decision to initiate, continue, or 
inhibit the adaptive responses, the dependent variables in research on PMT are typically 
measures of behavioral intentions (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997). The purpose of PMT 
research is usually to persuade people to follow the communicator’s recommendations, so 
intentions indicate the effectiveness of the attempted persuasion. 
 Core constructs. Threat appraisal is based on the perceived vulnerability, which 
is the estimation of the chance of contracting a disease, and perceived severity, which is 
an estimation of the seriousness of a disease on the individual’s life. Coping appraisal 
consists of response efficacy, which is the efficacy of the recommended preventive 
behavior, and self-efficacy, which is the level of confidence in one’s ability to undertake 
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the recommended preventive behavior. Response efficacy is the individual’s expectancy 
that carrying out recommendations can remove the threat. Self-efficacy is the belief in 
one’s ability to execute the recommend courses of action successfully. Protection 
motivation is a mediating variable whose function is to arouse, sustain, and direct 
protective health behavior (Boer & Seydel, 1996). The relationships of the constructs can 
be seen in Figure 13.  
 Previous research. The Protection Motivation Theory can be used for 
influencing and predicting various behaviors. PMT has been used to study health 
behavior in a variety of health-related topics. 
 These topics include asthma (Mesters, Meertens, Kok, & Percel, 1994) cancer 
screening and prevention (Myers et al., 1994; Seydel, Taal, & Wiegman, 1990; Sutton, 
Bickler, Sancho-Aldridge, & Saidi, 1994), depression (Self & Rogers, 1990), drug and 
alcohol use (Epstein, Botvin, Diaz, & Toth, 1995; Stainback & Rogers, 1983), exercise 
(Fruin, Pratt, & Owen, 1992; Wurtele & Maddux, 1987), HIV/AIDS/STD (Ahia, 1991; 
Basen-Engquist, 1994), muscular dystrophy (Flynn, Lyman, & Prentice-Dunn, 1995), and 
smoking (Ho, 1992; Rogers & Deckner, 1975).  
 
 
 
Figure 13. Protection Motivation Theory (Rogers, 1975). 
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 The PMT is well suited to studying protection behaviors outside the health care 
field. Within 15 years of its inception, PMT had been applied to over 30 different 
domains, both inside and outside the health-related contexts (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 
1997). Protection motivation theory has been applied to research in IS by various 
researchers to study information security (Cheneweth, Minch, & Gattiker, 2009; LaRose, 
Rifon, & Enbody, 2008; Pahnila, Siponen, & Mahmood, 2007; Weirich & Sasse, 2001; 
Woon, Tan, & Low, 2005; Workman, Bommer, & Straub, 2008). Protection Motivation 
Theory has been used in these studies to examine the effectiveness of fear appeals or 
recommendations that a suggested course of action be followed to avert negative 
consequences.  
Summary of Literature Review 
 
 The issue of information security adoption on home computers is an important 
research topic for MIS researchers. The current MIS adoption models tend to emphasize 
constructs that measure an expected utility to the adopter. Since information security 
software offers little obvious utility, the problem of security adoption must be approached 
in a different manner (Conklin, 2006). 
 There are remarkable similarities between the adoption of security software to 
protect a home computer and the adoption of disease prevention measures in the 
healthcare field. Using the Health Belief Model may facilitate better determination of 
behavioral antecedents that affect the acceptance and usage of computer security 
software. The choice to use HBM as a contributor to the model over the PMT is due to 
the PMT being an extension of the HBM. The PMT was designed to elicit a behavioral 
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response by the introduction of fear appeals. The PMT also focuses on the cognitive 
process involved in the decision process. This makes PMT better suited for a mixed 
method design. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
RESEARCH MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
 
This chapter presents a research model and the formulation of several research 
hypotheses. This study will explore the behaviors of home computer users in relation to 
the security measures taken on their computers using the Health Belief Model to provide 
direction in model construction. The original HBM modeled socio-demographic factors 
as antecedents of Perceived Vulnerability, Perceived Severity, Perceived Benefits, 
Perceived Barriers, and Self-Efficacy. For this study the socio-demographic factors are 
used as moderators for the independent variables as this modification is more appropriate 
to the context of this study. The chapter begins by presenting the constructs of the 
research model, the theoretical foundation for their inclusion in the model, and the 
associated hypotheses. The chapter concludes with a summary of the model and the 
hypotheses.   
 
Core Constructs 
 
 In this section the development of the core constructs of the research model 
constructs are discussed. These constructs include perceived vulnerability, perceived 
severity, perceived benefits, perceived barriers, self-efficacy, and cues to action.  
 
Perceived Vulnerability (VUL) 
 In the health belief model as defined by Rosenstock (1966), the construct 
perceived susceptibility refers to the “subjective risks of contracting a condition” (p. 6) 
and that these perceptions vary widely from one person to another. When confronted by 
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risk of disease, one individual may deny any possibility of contracting the condition, 
another may recognize the statistical probability, and yet another may feel that he/she is 
in real danger of contracting the condition (Rosenstock, 1966). For this research, 
perceived susceptibility is an individual’s judgment of the risk of his or her computer 
contracting a particular security related issue and has been renamed perceived 
vulnerability for the research model. In the context of computer security, perceived 
vulnerability refers to a user's perceived likelihood of the occurrence of a security 
incident. When an individual perceives higher vulnerability to security incidents, he/she 
will be likely to use appropriate computer security software to mitigate the risk. The 
hypothesis for this construct is as follows: 
 H1 – Perceived Vulnerability to security incidents is positively related to 
 computer security usage. 
 
Perceived Severity (SEV) 
 In the Health Belief Model, the construct perceived seriousness refers to a 
person's perception of the seriousness of a given health problem. Perceived seriousness is 
not limited to the clinical consequence of a health problem but may extend to the 
implications on the individual's job security or negative effects on the individual’s family. 
(Rosenstock, 1966). Though the consequences of a security incident may be severe, 
individuals may have a different perception of the severity or extent of the damage a 
security incident may cause on their home computers. For this research model, the 
construct of perceived severity parallels the HBM seriousness construct and is defined to 
be a user's perceived seriousness of a security incident and its impact on lifestyle, which 
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should lead to a higher motivation to utilize computer security software. The hypothesis 
for this construct is as follows: 
 H2 – Perceived severity of security incidents is positively related to computer 
 security usage. 
 
Perceived Benefits (BEN) 
 In the Health Belief Model, perceived benefits refer to an individual's perceptions 
of the relative effectiveness of an action to reduce the disease threat (Rosenstock, 1966). 
For this research, perceived benefits refer to a user's belief in the perceived effectiveness 
of using computer security software; higher perceived benefits are likely to result in 
increased computer security software usage. The hypothesis for this construct is as 
follows:  
 H3 – Perceived benefits of practicing computer security are positively related to 
 computer security usage. 
 
Perceived Barriers (BAR) 
 The perceived barriers construct is the individual’s belief in the benefits compared 
to the perceived costs of action. Although individuals may believe that a given action is 
effective in reducing threat, they may find that action to be inconvenient or unpleasant to 
them (Rosenstock, 1966). Analogous to preventive healthcare actions, computer security 
software usage often causes inconvenience and unpleasantness through additional 
controls. For this research, perceived barriers is defined as an individual’s perceived cost 
and inconvenience of using computer security software, which is likely to reduce the 
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motivation to utilize such software. The hypothesis for this construct is as follows: 
 H4 - Perceived barriers of practicing computer security are negatively related to 
 computer security usage. 
 
Self-Efficacy (SEF) 
 Self-efficacy is another predictor of behavior in the Health Belief Model. The 
roots of self-efficacy come from social cognitive theory and refer to individuals’ self-
confidence in their ability to perform a behavior to produce the desired outcomes 
(Bandura, 1997). According to social cognitive theory, individuals with greater 
confidence in their abilities are more likely to initiate challenging behaviors. For this 
study, self-efficacy specifically refers to the belief that the individual can install, 
configure, and maintain the security software on their computer, which is likely to 
increase computer security behavior. The hypothesis for this construct is as follows: 
 H5 – Information Security Self-efficacy is positively related to computer security 
 usage. 
 
Cues to Action (CUE) 
 When defining the Health Belief Model, Rosenstock (1966) believed that 
healthcare action may not take place unless a triggering event occurs to set the process in 
motion. The perceptions of susceptibility, seriousness, benefits, barriers, and self-efficacy 
can create a readiness to act and that actual change often occurs when some external or 
internal cue triggers action. Examples of cues to action include internal perceptions of 
symptoms, impact of communications media, knowledge of someone suffering from a 
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similar disease, or reminders from doctors. In this research, cues to action refer to 
experiences or triggers that would motivate an individual to use computer security 
software. Examples of triggering events in this research include computer symptoms 
relating to attacks, media alerts of security vulnerabilities, operating system manufacture 
warnings, and knowledge of other individuals experiencing security issues. A greater 
number of cues to action are likely to lead to increased computer security behavior. The 
hypothesis for this construct is as follows: 
 H6 - Cues to action are positively related to computer security usage. 
 
Moderating Constructs 
 
 The Health Belief Model theorizes that demographic, socio-psychological, and 
structural factors are antecedent influences of perceived susceptibility, seriousness, 
benefits, barriers, and self-efficacy and preventive healthcare behavior. Liang and Xue 
(2009) stated in their study of avoiding IT threats that “ample evidence demonstrates that 
risk tolerance is a personal trait related to demographics variables including age, gender, 
marital status, race, religion, education and income” (p. 84). They believed that this risk 
tolerance would also direct relate to the risk tolerance and avoidance behavior of IT 
users. This research will use the demographic moderators of Gender, Age, and Education 
and the structural variable of prior experience with computer security attacks in a 
moderated relationship between demographic and structural variables and the main 
predicting variables. Moderated relationships of this nature were successfully modeled in 
IS research by Venkatesh et al. (2003) in the creation of the UTAUT. These moderating 
variables will be used to determine the level of impact each may have on the relationship 
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between the variables vulnerabilities, severity, benefits, barriers, and self-efficacy (VUL, 
SEV, BEN, BAR, SEF) and the dependent variable Computer Security Usage (SSU). The 
hypotheses for these constructs are as follows: 
 
Gender (GEN)  
H7a - Gender significantly moderates the relationship between Perceived 
Vulnerability and Computer Security usage. 
H7b - Gender significantly moderates the relationship between Perceived Severity 
and Computer Security usage. 
H7c - Gender significantly moderates the relationship between Perceived Benefits 
and Computer Security usage. 
H7d - Gender significantly moderates the relationship between Perceived Barriers 
and Computer Security usage. 
H7e - Gender significantly moderates the relationship between Information 
Security Self-efficacy and Computer Security usage. 
 
Age (AGE) 
H8a - Age significantly moderates the relationship between Perceived 
Vulnerability and Computer Security usage. 
H8b - Age significantly moderates the relationship between Perceived Severity 
and Computer Security usage. 
H8c - Age significantly moderates the relationship between Perceived Benefits 
and Computer Security usage. 
H8d - Age significantly moderates the relationship between Perceived Barriers 
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and Computer Security usage. 
H8e - Age significantly moderates the relationship between Information Security 
Self-efficacy and Computer Security usage. 
 
Education (EDU)  
H9a - Education significantly moderates the relationship between Perceived 
Vulnerability and Computer Security usage. 
H9b - Education significantly moderates the relationship between Perceived 
Severity and Computer Security usage. 
H9c - Education significantly moderates the relationship between Perceived 
Benefits and Computer Security usage. 
H9d - Education significantly moderates the relationship between Perceived 
Barriers and Computer Security usage. 
H9e - Education significantly moderates the relationship between Information 
Security Self-efficacy and Computer Security usage. 
 
Prior Experience (PXP)  
H10a - Prior Experience significantly moderates the relationship between 
Perceived Vulnerability and Computer Security usage. 
H10b - Prior Experience significantly moderates the relationship between 
Perceived Severity and Computer Security usage. 
H10c - Prior Experience significantly moderates the relationship between 
Perceived Benefits and Computer Security usage. 
H10d - Prior Experience significantly moderates the relationship between 
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Perceived Barriers and Computer Security usage. 
H10e - Prior Experience significantly moderates the relationship between 
Information Security Self-efficacy and Computer Security usage. 
 
Chapter Summary 
 
 This chapter has presented the research model and the hypotheses. The objective 
of this stage in the study was to introduce the core and moderating constructs and to 
develop a model of the relationships between these constructs based on the Health Belief 
Model as proposed by Rosenstock (1966). The research model representing the constructs 
and their relationships is shown in Figure 14. The following chapter discusses the 
methodology that will be used to test these hypotheses. 
 
 
Figure 14. Research model 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
 
 This chapter describes the research methods and procedures that were 
implemented to test the model and associated hypotheses presented in the previous 
chapter. This research used a non-experimental design utilizing an Internet-based survey 
to assess the proposed model and research hypotheses.  This chapter presents the 
population under study, survey development, operationalization of constructs, and pretest 
results. Finally, the data collection method is presented.  
 
Population 
 
 
 The population of interest for this study is all of the home computer users that are 
at least partially responsible for the implementation and maintenance of the software on 
their computers. Since this study focuses on the use of security software such as anti-
virus, firewall, and anti-spyware, anyone who could benefit from this software is 
included in the population. The latest population statistics from the U.S. Census Bureau 
show that there are approximately 72 million Internet-enabled households in the United 
States (U.S. Census Bureau, 2007). Most of the computer owners in this group manage 
their own software installations and this research is limited to home computer users who 
self-identify a responsibility for maintaining their home computer.  
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Survey Development 
 
 Since the constructs found in the HBM parallel constructs that are found in other 
research models, the survey used items adapted from other research on Information 
Security (Boss, 2007; Conklin, 2006). The scales created in previous Information 
Security research have been tested for validity and reliability. Use of previously validated 
scales increases the trustworthiness of results obtained by this study. To further increase 
validity, a review process was followed for scale creation. For constructs in the Health 
Belief Model that had not yet been tested in the context of computer security, questions 
were constructed and then reviewed for clarity and correctness with respect to computer 
security and with the population of study as the intended recipients. Reviewers for this 
process included Ph.D. students, professors from the field of management information 
systems, undergraduate college students, and several home PC users.  
 
Operationalization of the Constructs 
 
 The ability of the research model to test the hypothesized relationships is dependent 
on the manner in which the operationalization of the constructs is performed (Straub, 
1989). This section is a description of the operationalization of each of the research 
constructs as used in the final data collection. 
 
Demographics Variables 
 
 The demographic variables of gender, education, and primary operating system 
were assessed using categorical response options, while age was measure using a 
continuous scale. Scales were developed to ensure enough choices to obtain the 
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sensitivity necessary for regression analysis. While data on primary operating system are 
being collected in the pretest and main data collection, this data is strictly for 
demographics and will not be used in the analysis of the research model for this study. 
Operationalization of the demographic variables can be found in Table 1.  
 
Perceived Vulnerability, Perceived Severity,  
and Perceived Benefits 
 
 Perceived vulnerability is a user's perceived likelihood of a security attack on 
their home computer and perceived severity refers to a user's perceived seriousness of a 
security attack on their home computer. Boss (2007) used these constructs in the research 
model he created to analyze security behaviors in the context of control theory.  
 
Table 1 
 
Demographic Variables 
Variable Question Response Options 
Gender Are you Male or Female? Male 
Female 
   
Age What is your age? 1-year increments from 18 to 115 years of age. 
   
Education What is the highest level of 
education you have 
completed? 
 
Less than High School 
High School or equivalent 
Some College 
Career Training 
2-Year College Degree (Associates) 
4-Year College Degree (BA, BS) 
Master's Degree  
Doctoral Degree 
Professional Degree (MD, JD) 
   
Primary 
Operating 
System 
What primary operating 
system does your home 
computer use? 
 
Windows XP 
Windows Vista 
Windows 7 
Apple OS X  
Linux (Ubuntu, Red Hat, SUSE, etc) 
Unix (BSD, HP, Solaris, etc) 
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Questions in his research were adapted from a USDOJ National Crime Victimization 
Survey published in 2001 specific to computer fraud, virus exposure, physical 
threat/obscene e-mail reception, and software copyright violation. Each item “assesses 
the degree to which individuals feel that it is likely they will experience the scenario, and 
assesses the impact to them were it to happen” (Boss, 2007, p. 75).  
 This research uses items as adapted by Boss to assess the likelihood that they will 
experience a specific scenario, and assess the impact to them were it to happen. Perceived 
vulnerability is measured on a 7-point Likert scale from Highly-Unlikely to Highly-
Likely. Perceived severity is measured on a seven-point Likert scale from Very-Low 
Impact to Very-High Impact. The Vulnerability and Severity scenarios can be seen in 
Table 2.  
 Perceived Benefits is a user's perceived effectiveness of using computer security 
software to mitigate the perceived vulnerability to a security incident. The measurements 
for this construct are designed to assess the belief that implementing computer security 
will prevent the scenarios presented in Table 2. These questions are assessed using a 
seven-point Likert scale from Highly Disagree to Highly Agree.  
 
Perceived Barriers 
 
 Perceived barriers refer to a user's perceived cost and inconvenience of practicing 
computer security. In a study by Conklin (2006), various constructs were designed to 
assess the research model constructed using the Diffusion of Innovation Theory (Rogers, 
2003). 
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Table 2  
 
Security Incident Scenarios 
  
Scenario Question 
1 My computer system becoming corrupted by a virus or worm.  
2 My computer system being taken over by a hacker. 
3 My data corrupted by a virus or cyber-attack. 
4 My identity stolen (credit card number, Social Security 
Number, Bank account information, etc.). 
5 My data lost due to a virus or worm on my computer. 
6 The Internet becoming inaccessible because of computer 
security problems. 
7 Downloading a file that is infected with a virus through my e-
mail. 
8 Downloading a file that is infected with a virus from the 
internet. 
 
 
 One of the constructs Conklin, (2006) designed was Suitability, which was 
designed to measure users’ perception of the benefits and barriers for usage of computer 
security software. Of these questions he designed using a focus panel, questions relating 
to the perceived barriers were adapted for use in this research. These questions are 
measured with a seven-point Likert scale from Highly Disagree to Highly Agree (BAR1, 
“The expense of security software is a concern for me”; BAR2, “Using security software 
would change the way I use my computer”; BAR3, “Using security software effectively 
is time consuming”; BAR4, “Using security software is would require considerable 
investment of effort other than time”). 
 
Self-Efficacy 
 
 Self-efficacy is a user's self-confidence in his/her skills or ability in practicing 
computer security. In the study by Conklin (2006) discussed in the previous construct, the 
construct of Self-efficacy Security Skills was designed to measure users confidence of 
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their own ability to select, install and maintain computer security software. Conklin used 
a four-item scale to assess the level of self-efficacy with computer security software. 
These questions were adopted for this study as tested by Conklin. The only exception is 
the rewording of the question that Conklin used to evaluate the ability to maintain 
computer security software. This question was changed to assess the ability of the 
individual to properly configure computer security software. Reliability and construct 
validity for this adapted scale was verified during the analysis phase of this study as 
reported in Chapter V.  
 These questions are measured on seven-point Likert scale from Not At All 
Confident to Totally Confident (SEF1, “I can select the appropriate security software for 
my home computer”; SEF2, “I can correctly install security software on my home 
computer(s)”; SEF3, “I can correctly configure security software on my home 
computer(s)”; SEF4, “I can find the information I need if I have problems using security 
software on my home computer(s)”). 
 
Cues to Action 
 
 Cues to action is the construct that that refers to experiences or triggers that would 
motivate and activate a user to use computer security software. In the Health Belief 
Model these cues or triggers can take the form of media reports, influences from people 
the individuals knows, reminders from doctors, or a symptom related to an illness 
recognized from past experience (Rosenstock, 1966). In the context of computer security 
these cues can be media reports of new viruses or vulnerabilities, friends and relatives 
being attacked, reminder messages from software companies, or the computer exhibiting 
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unusual behavior. The questions are measured on a seven-point Likert scale from Highly 
Disagree to Highly Agree (CUE1, “If a friend were to tell me of a recent experience with 
a computer virus, I would be more conscious of my computer's chance of being 
attacked”; CUE2, “If my computer started behaving strangely, I would be concerned it 
had been the victim of a security attack”; CUE3, “If I saw a news report, or read a 
newspaper or magazine about a new computer vulnerability, I would be more concerned 
about my computer's chances of being attacked”; CUE4, “If I received an email from the 
maker of my computer’s operating system about a new security vulnerability, I would be 
more concerned about my computer's chances of being attacked”). 
 
Prior Experience  
 
 Prior experience refers to the user’s prior experience with security incidents. The 
experience with a previous illness was proposed by Rosenstock et al (1994) to moderate 
the relationship between the perceptual variables (susceptibility, seriousness, benefits, 
barriers, and self-efficacy) and the appropriate preventative healthcare behavior. For this 
research, the prior experience construct is the individual’s past experience with computer 
security incidents. In Conklin (2006), prior experience with security attacks was 
measures on the basis of frequency, recency, and severity. Three questions from this pool 
were selected and adapted for this research. The question to determine how frequently the 
individual has been affected by a security incident is measured using a seven-point Likert 
scale from Never to All the Time. The question to determine how recently the individual 
has been affected by a security incident is measured using a seven-point Likert scale from 
Never to Within the Last Week. The impact of a previous security incident has been 
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measured on a seven-point Likert scale from Very Low/No Impact to Very High Impact 
(PXP1, “How frequently have you been affected by a computer security problem?”; 
PXP2, “How recently have you been affected by a computer security problem?”; PXP3, 
“The level of impact I have experienced from a computer security problem is:”). 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
 Actual Computer Security Usage, as self-reported by respondents taking the 
survey, is the dependent variable of this study. Similar to the preventive healthcare 
behaviors used in disease prevention research using the Health Belief Model, the use of 
anti-virus, firewall, and anti-spyware software is beneficial to prevent most computer 
security incidents. The usage of computer security is measured based on the percentage 
of the time that individuals utilize computer security software. The scale is measured on a 
seven-point Likert scale from Never to Always (SSU1, “I use add-on anti-virus software 
on my home computer(s); SSU2, “I use add-on firewall software on my home 
computer(s)”; SSU3 I use add-on anti-spyware software on my home computer(s)”). 
 
Pretest  
 
 After construction of the survey items, a pretest was administered to a 
convenience sample of students from different majors attending an introductory MIS 
class at a major university during the Fall Semester 2009. The pretest obtained a total of 
55 responses, of which all were usable in order to identify weaknesses in question 
wording and analyze the reliability of the scales used. Based on relevant comments by 
those that took the survey, some items were reworded to enhance understanding by 
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respondents with non-technical backgrounds. The constructs operationalized in the 
previous section reflect the changes to enhance participant understanding of question 
intent and response options as well as a change in the scale of the dependent variable 
from agree/disagree, to frequency of usage.  
 
Respondent Demographics 
Demographic information for the pretest respondents is presented in Table 3. The 
demographics were consistent with an undergraduate MIS class. It is expected that for the 
main data collection there will be more diversity in responses and that we should see that 
gender would be approximately equal, more education levels would be represented, and 
more variation would exist in the age of respondents.  
 
Reliability 
 
 Cronbach’s alpha measures the internal consistency of the items in the factor. 
 The lower limit for an acceptable Cronbach’s alpha is 0.7, though 0.6 may be acceptable 
for newly defined scales (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998). A reliability analysis 
of the constructs revealed that the target of Cronbach’s alpha of 0.7 was attained for all 
theorized constructs, indicating that proceeding with the main data collection using the 
items in the pretest is acceptable (see Table 4). 
The low sample size of 55 was insufficient to be usable for factor analysis, which 
is used to ensure that convergent and discriminate validity, subtypes of construct validity, 
have been achieved. A change in the scale of the dependent variable from agree/disagree, 
to frequency of usage, made a regression analysis at this stage also impractical. 
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Table 3 
 
Pretest Demographic Data 
Characteristics Frequency Percent (%) 
Gender   
Male 40 72.7 
Female 15 27.3 
   
Age   
18-20 17 30.9 
21-30 38 69.1 
31-40 - - 
41-50 - - 
51-60 - - 
61 or over - - 
   
Education   
Less Than High School - - 
High School or Equiv. 4 7.3 
Some College 37 67.3 
Career Training - - 
2 Year Degree 14 25.5 
4 Year Degree - - 
Master’s Degree - - 
Doctorate Degree - - 
Professional Degree - - 
   
Primary Operating System   
Windows XP 12 21.8 
Windows Vista 25 45.5 
Windows 7 5 9.1 
Linux - - 
UNIX - - 
Apple OS X 13 23.6 
 
 
Table 4 
Pretest Reliability Analysis 
Construct Number of Items 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Perceived Vulnerability 8 0.921 
Perceived Severity 8 0.916 
Perceived Benefits 8 0.939 
Perceived Barriers 4 0.735 
Self Efficacy 4 0.916 
Cues to Action 4 0.801 
Computer Security Usage 3 0.845 
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Data Collection 
 
 One of the major limitations with a target population as large as all Internet 
accessing computer owners is that the target population is undefined. As such, 
constructing a valid sampling frame is extremely difficult, as all members of the target 
population cannot easily be identified, resulting in sampling error. Couper (2000) stated 
that “sampling error arises from the fact that not all members of the frame population are 
measured.” Should the selection process be repeated, a slightly different set of sample 
individuals would be obtained. Coverage error is a function of both the proportion of the 
target population that is not covered by the frame and the difference on the survey 
statistic between those covered and those not covered (Groves, 1989). While a 
statistically valid sampling frame cannot be constructed for the target population in this 
study, an attempt to introduce randomness into the sampling process can be attempted. 
 Brown and Venkatesh (2005) sampled home users during the study of the Model 
of Adoption of Technology in Households. They obtained their sample by having a 
market research firm randomly select names from their database. This method was 
employed to distribute email invitations to potential survey participants for this research. 
 A marketing firm was hired to distribute an email invitation to customers of 
Internet Service Providers in the United States. Text of the email sent can be found in 
Appendix A.  
 The result of the e-mail campaign was that of the 300,000 e-mail invitations sent, 
78,555 were opened. Of those who opened the e-mail, only 69 individuals used the link to 
navigate to the survey. However, no completed surveys were collected.  
   61 
 
Given the sensitive subject of computer security and the ongoing awareness 
campaigns to warn email users about e-mail security threats, this result is not entirely 
surprising. An analysis of the method of distribution, and the message sent, could lead 
many to be distrustful of the invitation, resulting in nonparticipation. A method to bypass 
these feelings of mistrust and get users to seriously evaluate an invitation to this research 
was needed. 
 Snowball sampling is a non-probability technique for developing a research 
sample where existing study subjects recruit future subjects from among their own social 
networks. Snowball sampling can be effective in reaching members of the target 
population where the members are not known, or in hidden populations where the 
members of the population do not wish to be known. In this sampling method, initial 
members of the target population are identified and then either asked to provide the 
researchers with other possible candidates from the same population of interest or recruit 
others into the research directly by providing them with participation information. In 
either case, recruitment continues until the sample reaches the size necessary for data 
analysis.  
 Snowball sampling was employed to recruit participants into the research study. 
Recruitment began with members of an undergraduate class at a university in the western 
United States. The survey invitations were posted to Google newsgroups chosen at 
random covering various topic threads from several geographic areas in the United 
States. The survey was posted to surveyshare.com and can been found in Appendix B. 
Given the snowball method of invitation distribution, and the anonymous nature of the 
survey collection, tracking the number of invitations sent is not possible. This website 
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allows the survey to be filled out anonymously, but prevents multiple surveys from an 
individual through the use of an email address to screen previous responses. A review of 
the research methods used in this study was completed by the appropriate institutional 
review board (IRB). The IRB certification for this study can be found in Appendix C. 
Analysis of the completed surveys can be found in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 
 This chapter presents the characteristics of the study sample, its analysis and the 
results of statistical analysis. The study data set is collected using a survey distributed via 
an email message with a link to the survey. The sample set as initially collected contains 
186 responses. Eighteen of the surveys have missing data, and the method of dealing with 
this data is detailed. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the hypotheses presented 
in Chapter III. 
 
Sample Characteristics 
 
 The beginning of the survey contained demographic variables pertinent to the 
research model (gender, age, and education) as well as the demographic of primary 
operating system, which only used for description of the respondents. Table 5 shows the 
demographic results for gender, age, and education.  
Male respondents accounted for a slightly larger portion of the respondents 
(51.1%). The largest number of respondents report that their education level is “Some 
College” (44.6%). The majority of respondents report that their primary operating system 
is Microsoft Windows, with Windows XP the most prevalent version.  
Descriptive statistics of reported age (measure on a continuous scale) show the 
range of respondent ages was 18-79 with an average age of 37.3, with a standard 
deviation of 17.36, skew of .60, and a kurtosis of -1.06. While these statistics would  
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Table 5 
Initial Sample Characteristics 
Variable Frequency Percent (%) 
Gender     
Male  95  51.1 
Female  91  48.9 
   
Education     
Less Than High School  1  0.5 
High School or Equiv.  16  8.6 
Some College  83  44.6 
Career Training  8  4.3 
2 Year Degree  39  21.2 
4 Year Degree  22  11.8 
Master’s Degree  13  7.0 
Doctorate Degree  2  1.1 
Professional Degree  2  1.1 
   
Primary Operating System    
Windows XP  60  32.3 
Windows Vista  55  29.6 
Windows 7  38  20.4 
Apple OS X  30  16.1 
Linux  3  1.6 
UNIX  -  - 
 
 
indicate a normal age distribution, a look at the histogram of respondent ages shown in 
Figure 15 shows that the descriptive statistics are misleading. The histogram shows that 
the distribution is bimodal with the highest peak occurring with users in the range of 20-
25 years of age. This is primarily the result of the snowball sampling being started 
primarily with undergraduate students. However, the scatterplot of the age of respondent 
shown in Figure 16 illustrates the progression of the sampling by respondent and that as 
the snowball sampling continued, the sample grew more diverse in age. Had the sampling 
been allowed to continue deeper into the population, the sample should have become  
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Figure 15. Histogram of respondent ages 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Scatterplot of age and respondent number. 
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more normally distributed with respect to age and more representative to the target 
population with respect to all demographics (Heckathorn, 1997). 
 
Missing Data Analysis 
 
A visual analysis of the dataset revealed two cases with excessive missing 
responses. The two cases visually identified are 100 and 115. Before removing these 
cases, a missing data analysis was conducted using the Missing Data Analysis module in 
SPSS. The initial sample contained 186 respondents and the missing data analysis 
identified 18 cases with missing data. The cases identified with missing values can be 
seen in Table 6. Cases 100 and 115, which were identified visually, were removed from 
the dataset. Case 100 was removed because it was missing values for all questions 
relating to perceived benefits. Case 115 was removed because values were missing for 
questions relating to several constructs including the dependent variable. Demographic 
information for gender, education, and primary operating system for the remaining 184 
respondents can be seen in Table 7. Age, which was measure on a continuous scale, 
provides the best evidence that dropping the two anomalous cases outlined above did not 
significantly alter the demographic profile of the respondents. The statistics for age 
changed a minimal amount with an average age of 36.94, standard deviation of 17.07, 
skew of .61, and a kurtosis of -1.04.  
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Table 6 
 
Cases with Missing Data 
Case # Missing % Missing 
7 1 2.1 
12 1 2.1 
34 1 2.1 
50 1 2.1 
72 1 2.1 
75 1 2.1 
85 1 2.1 
100 8 17 
102 1 2.1 
115 18 38.3 
116 3 6.4 
123 1 2.1 
126 1 2.1 
128 1 2.1 
156 1 2.1 
161 1 2.1 
166 1 2.1 
182 1 2.1 
 
 
Table 7 
Final Sample Characteristics 
Variable Frequency Percent (%) 
Gender     
Male  95  51.6 
Female  89  48.4 
   
Education     
Less Than High School  1  0.5 
High School or Equiv.  15  8.2 
Some College  82  44.6 
Career Training  8  4.3 
2 Year Degree  39  21.2 
4 Year Degree  22  12.0 
Master’s Degree  13  7.1 
Doctorate Degree  2  1.1 
Professional Degree  2  1.1 
   
Primary Operating System    
Windows XP  58  31.5 
Windows Vista  55  29.9 
Windows 7  38  20.7 
Apple OS X  30  16.3 
Linux  3  1.6 
UNIX  -  - 
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Replacing Missing Values 
After the two cases with excessive missing values were removed, a second 
missing data analysis revealed that the remaining missing values were Missing 
Completely At Random (MCAR) based on the results of the Little’s MCAR test: chi-
square = 548.208, df = 535, Sig = .337. This indicates that using the missing data 
replacement options available in the Missing Data Analysis module would be 
appropriate. The Estimation-Maximization (EM) method was used to replace missing 
values. Once these values were replaced, descriptive statistics were computed on the 
questions contained in the survey. Descriptive statistics for these items variables are 
available in Table 8.  
The descriptive statistics show that for each variable, the range of responses 
covered the entire range of possible choices. The only exception is with CUE2, which 
had a lowest response of 2. Values below the scale minimum of 1 were observed with 
SSU3 and SEF3. This is due to the missing value estimation-maximization replacement 
method employed.  
 
Construct Validity and Reliability 
 
 The following section discusses the results of the analysis to determine the 
adequacy of questions used to formulate the constructs found in the model. In this section 
the results for the tests of scale reliability using Chronbach’s alpha and construct validity 
using factor analysis will be reported. Once the reliability and validity of the items used 
in the constructs has been established, and the single measures of the constructs 
computed, the data will be ready to test the hypotheses. 
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Table 8 
 
Item Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Item Min Max Mean St. Dev. Skew St. Err Kurtosis St. Err. 
Vulnerability VUL1 1.000 7.000 3.886 1.842 0.085 0.179 -1.179 0.356 
 VUL2 1.000 7.000 3.326 1.670 0.503 0.179 -0.805 0.356 
 VUL3 1.000 7.000 3.777 1.832 0.118 0.179 -1.277 0.356 
 VUL4 1.000 7.000 3.681 1.620 0.224 0.179 -0.844 0.356 
 VUL5 1.000 7.000 3.777 1.861 0.083 0.179 -1.214 0.356 
 VUL6 1.000 7.000 3.717 1.773 0.121 0.179 -1.016 0.356 
 VUL7 1.000 7.000 3.848 1.941 0.018 0.179 -1.261 0.356 
 VUL8 1.000 7.000 4.245 1.858 -0.192 0.179 -1.142 0.356 
          
Severity SEV1 1.000 7.000 4.924 1.517 -0.659 0.179 -0.125 0.356 
 SEV2 1.000 7.000 5.418 1.534 -1.171 0.179 1.000 0.356 
 SEV3 1.000 7.000 5.128 1.618 -0.879 0.179 0.084 0.356 
 SEV4 1.000 7.000 6.275 1.360 -2.488 0.179 6.108 0.356 
 SEV5 1.000 7.000 5.141 1.663 -0.753 0.179 -0.341 0.356 
 SEV6 1.000 7.000 4.870 1.677 -0.628 0.179 -0.444 0.356 
 SEV7 1.000 7.000 4.842 1.667 -0.735 0.179 -0.275 0.356 
 SEV8 1.000 7.000 4.859 1.673 -0.743 0.179 -0.273 0.356 
          
Benefits BEN1 1.000 7.000 5.033 1.305 -1.030 0.179 0.436 0.356 
 BEN2 1.000 7.000 4.615 1.409 -0.616 0.179 -0.247 0.356 
 BEN3 1.000 7.000 4.799 1.312 -0.737 0.179 0.153 0.356 
 BEN4 1.000 7.000 4.357 1.446 -0.326 0.179 -0.764 0.356 
 BEN5 1.000 7.000 4.764 1.377 -0.748 0.179 -0.084 0.356 
 BEN6 1.000 7.000 4.653 1.470 -0.611 0.179 -0.383 0.356 
 BEN7 1.000 7.000 4.902 1.407 -0.861 0.179 0.194 0.356 
 BEN8 1.000 7.000 4.845 1.407 -0.803 0.179 0.067 0.356 
          
Barriers BAR1 1.000 7.000 4.799 1.767 -0.669 0.179 -0.557 0.356 
 BAR2 1.000 7.000 3.768 1.779 0.020 0.179 -1.196 0.356 
 BAR3 1.000 7.000 3.800 1.724 0.017 0.179 -1.148 0.356 
 BAR4 1.000 7.000 3.622 1.648 0.165 0.179 -0.892 0.356 
          
Cues to Action CUE1 1.000 7.000 4.946 1.632 -0.888 0.179 -0.001 0.356 
 CUE2 2.000 7.000 5.272 1.247 -0.785 0.179 0.377 0.356 
 CUE3 1.000 7.000 4.826 1.460 -0.778 0.179 0.040 0.356 
 CUE4 1.000 7.000 5.371 1.306 -0.983 0.179 0.894 0.356 
          
Computer Security Usage SSU1 1.000 7.000 4.750 2.158 -0.467 0.179 -1.172 0.356 
 SSU2 1.000 7.000 4.399 2.356 -0.276 0.179 -1.487 0.356 
 SSU3 0.187 7.000 4.637 2.144 -0.457 0.179 -1.094 0.356 
          
Self-Efficacy SEF1 1.000 7.000 4.451 1.804 -0.369 0.179 -0.885 0.356 
 SEF2 1.000 7.000 4.921 1.864 -0.643 0.179 -0.679 0.356 
 SEF3 0.693 7.000 4.356 1.934 -0.255 0.179 -1.181 0.356 
 SEF4 1.000 7.000 4.560 1.812 -0.316 0.179 -0.943 0.356 
          
Prior Experience PXP1 1.000 7.000 2.332 1.098 1.187 0.179 1.852 0.356 
 PXP2 1.000 7.000 2.609 1.589 1.308 0.179 1.067 0.356 
 PXP3 1.000 7.000 2.870 1.751 0.609 0.179 -0.684 0.356 
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 The research model contains six independent variables, four moderating variables, 
and the dependent variable.  The composite variables in the model are all designed to be 
reflective in nature. The composite variables in the research model include all 
independent variables (Vulnerability, Severity, Benefits, Barriers, Self-efficacy, and Cues 
to Action), the moderating variable of Prior Experience, and the dependent variable, 
Computer Security Usage.  
 
Reliability Analysis 
A reliability analysis of the items in the constructs was conducted using the Scale 
module of SPSS to verify that the scales constructed provided a reliable measure of the 
constructs they were intended to measure. During this process items in the perceived 
barriers, cues to action, and severity construct were identified as potential problems. The 
scale reliability of perceived barriers would be improved from 0.745 to 0.792 with the 
removal of BAR1. The scale reliability of cues to action would be improved from 0.751 
to 0.779 with the removal of CUE2. And finally, the scale reliability of perceived severity 
would be improved from 0.946 to 0.950 with the removal of SEV4.  The items CUE2 and 
BAR1 were removed to improve the reliability of their respective scales. However, item 
SEV4 was retained because the removal of this item would only improve Cronbach’s 
alpha for the perceived severity scale by 0.004. After removal of CUE2 and BAR 1, the 
final scale reliability for all constructs ranged from 0.703 to 0.951, indicating that the 
subscales have good reliability. The reliability analysis can be found in Table 9. 
Reliability of the final combined constructs after removal of BAR1 and CUE2 can be 
found in Table 10. 
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Table 9 
 
Reliability Analysis 
 Cronbach’s α α if Item Deleted 
Vulnerability .951  
VUL1  .942 
VUL2  .948 
VUL3  .939 
VUL4  .951 
VUL5  .941 
VUL6  .943 
VUL7  .948 
VUL8  .943 
Severity .946  
SEV1  .937 
SEV2  .941 
SEV3  .934 
SEV4  .950 
SEV5  .937 
SEV6  .943 
SEV7  .935 
SEV8  .934 
Benefits .934  
BEN1  .926 
BEN2  .924 
BEN3  .919 
BEN4  .930 
BEN5  .921 
BEN6  .927 
BEN7  .927 
BEN8  .927 
Barriers .745  
BAR1  .792 
BAR2  .718 
BAR3  .614 
BAR4  .703 
Cues to Action .751  
CUE1  .620 
CUE2  .779 
CUE3  .594 
CUE4  .733 
Computer Security Usage .900  
SSU1  .865 
SSU2  .893 
SSU3  .816 
Self Efficacy .949  
SEF1  .938 
SEF2  .934 
SEF3  .925 
SEF4  .936 
Prior Experience .703  
PXP1  .581 
PXP2  .583 
PXP3  .685 
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Table 10 
 
Scale Reliability 
Construct Number of Items Cronbach's Alpha 
Perceived Vulnerability 8 0.951 
Perceived Severity 8 0.946 
Perceived Benefits 8 0.934 
Perceived Barriers 3 0.792 
Cues to Action 3 0.779 
Self Efficacy 4 0.949 
Prior Experience 3 0.703 
Computer Security Usage 3 0.900 
 
 
Construct Validity 
An exploratory factor analysis using the principal component extraction method 
(varimax rotation with Eigenvalues greater than 1) was conducted using the Data 
Reduction module of SPSS. This analysis ensures that items load correctly on the 
constructs to which they are intended to load and do not cross load to other constructs. 
Results of this analysis can be found in Table 11.  
The result of the final factor analysis was an eight-factor solution in which all 
factors load cleanly on their intended constructs. All item loadings were higher than 0.7. 
except PXP3 (0.692), which measures the individual’s perceived severity of previous 
security attacks. Items with construct loadings lower than 0.7 are often deleted at this 
stage of a factor analysis unless removal of the construct would threaten content validity. 
The interaction of Prior Experience and Severity hypothesized in this study is dependent 
on this question being present in the construct. Therefore PXP3 was retained in the final 
Prior Experience construct.  The eight factors accounted for 75.7% of the total variance. 
A summary of the factor contributions to the overall variance can be found in Table 12. 
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Table 11 
 
Factor Loadings 
 Factor 
 VUL SEV BEN BAR CUE SSU SEF PXP 
VUL1 .853 .087 .024 -.008 -.052 .107 -.026 .272 
VUL2 .804 .126 .006 .060 .080 .065 -.116 .082 
VUL3 .901 .131 .043 -.039 -.066 .114 -.036 .189 
VUL4 .775 .207 -.074 .074 -.044 .062 -.025 -.163 
VUL5 .872 .142 .045 -.109 .015 .120 -.062 .137 
VUL6 .841 .146 .027 -.037 .115 .085 .010 .162 
VUL7 .834 .083 .015 -.023 .052 -.020 .042 .019 
VUL8 .861 .163 -.095 -.009 .089 .018 .074 .099 
SEV1 .150 .859 .128 -.038 .053 -.011 .049 .015 
SEV2 .169 .774 .115 -.110 .165 .037 -.035 .101 
SEV3 .131 .891 .113 -.062 .078 .034 -.075 -.003 
SEV4 .159 .683 -.054 -.151 .007 -.061 -.040 .115 
SEV5 .111 .868 .080 -.017 .086 .040 -.064 -.031 
SEV6 .070 .810 .137 -.015 .037 -.035 .076 .011 
SEV7 .140 .848 .190 .045 .136 .129 -.107 .084 
SEV8 .146 .860 .182 .038 .122 .113 -.088 .085 
BEN1 -.055 .193 .788 -.141 .054 .064 .033 -.064 
BEN2 .011 .075 .808 -.209 .066 .057 .078 -.097 
BEN3 .056 .093 .887 -.092 .069 .030 .035 .000 
BEN4 .104 .025 .762 -.064 .177 .070 .041 -.019 
BEN5 -.056 .084 .850 -.181 .066 .087 -.004 .012 
BEN6 -.038 .130 .780 -.056 .152 .175 -.005 .048 
BEN7 -.032 .121 .822 .164 -.077 -.083 .094 -.026 
BEN8 -.015 .114 .822 .144 -.104 -.070 .066 -.095 
BAR2 .013 -.064 -.029 .742 .187 .127 -.095 .002 
BAR3 -.049 -.157 -.157 .815 .122 -.224 -.093 .089 
BAR4 -.033 -.059 -.195 .796 .076 -.170 -.145 .158 
CUE1 .095 .172 .133 .137 .796 .039 -.093 .163 
CUE3 .042 .177 .101 .144 .834 .029 -.071 .037 
CUE4 .013 .174 .091 .096 .707 .019 -.073 -.199 
SSU1 .193 -.013 .142 -.209 .016 .842 .100 .075 
SSU2 .069 .055 .026 .042 .066 .903 .097 .039 
SSU3 .172 .099 .094 -.065 .007 .888 .110 .101 
SEF1 -.060 -.096 .065 -.131 -.033 .120 .898 -.034 
SEF2 .023 .029 .067 -.054 -.091 .057 .922 -.003 
SEF3 -.040 -.073 .077 -.068 -.070 .080 .931 .014 
SEF4 -.028 -.073 .072 -.072 -.046 .049 .914 -.013 
PXP1 .280 -.024 -.156 .074 -.051 .014 -.022 .761 
PXP2 .178 .076 -.041 .058 .053 .113 .106 .790 
PXP3 .149 .253 -.010 .094 -.012 .074 -.130 .692 
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Table 12 
 
Factor Analysis Variance Explained 
 Initial Eigenvalues 
Factor Total Variance % Cumulative 
Vulnerability 9.080 22.699 22.699 
Severity 6.193 15.481 38.180 
Benefits 4.506 11.264 49.444 
Self-Efficacy 3.179 7.947 57.391 
Computer Security Usage 2.335 5.838 63.229 
Barriers 2.168 5.421 68.650 
Cues to Action 1.676 4.189 72.839 
Prior Experience 1.150 2.876 75.715 
 
After verifying that scale reliability and construct validity were acceptable, the 
items for each factor were combined into a single factor score. The descriptive statistics 
shown in Table 21 illustrates that for many constructs, the range of the data covered the 
entire range of possible values (1 to 7). The only exceptions were Cues to Action, which 
had a lowest value of 1.67, Computer Security Usage, which had a lowest value of 0.836, 
and Prior Experience, which had a maximum value of 6. Skewness ranged from -0.963 to 
0.491, and kurtosis ranged from -1.054 to 0.606. When using the more liberal acceptable 
value of ±1.00 for skewness and kurtosis, the data presented in Table 13 shows that the 
data is fairly normally distributed. 
 
Table 13 
 
Construct Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Min Max Mean St. Dev. Skew St. Err. Kurtosis St. Err. 
Vulnerability 1.000 7.000 3.782 1.556 0.099 0.179 -1.046 0.356 
Severity 1.000 7.000 5.182 1.358 -0.963 0.179 0.606 0.356 
Benefits 1.000 7.000 4.746 1.152 -0.627 0.179 0.142 0.356 
Barriers 1.000 7.000 3.730 1.444 0.026 0.179 -0.728 0.356 
Cues to Action 1.670 7.000 5.048 1.226 -0.657 0.179 -0.083 0.356 
Self Efficacy 1.000 7.000 4.572 1.728 -0.416 0.179 -0.832 0.356 
Prior Experience 1.000 6.000 2.603 1.192 0.491 0.179 -0.184 0.356 
Computer Security Usage 0.836 7.000 4.595 2.028 -0.393 0.179 -1.054 0.356 
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Hypothesis Testing 
 
 
 To test the hypotheses outlined in Chapter III, a multiple regression analysis was 
conducted using SPSS with non-dichotomous variables mean-centered prior to the 
regression analysis. The regression was conducted using a hierarchical two-step method. 
In the first step, the dependent variable computer security usage was regressed on the 
independent variables of perceived vulnerability, perceived severity, perceived benefits, 
perceived barriers, self-efficacy, and cues to action to examine the main effects of the 
independent variables. The hypothesized moderating variables of gender, age, education, 
and prior experience, and the hypothesized two-way interactions between these 
moderating variables and the independent variables of vulnerability, severity, benefits, 
barriers, and self-efficacy were added to the regression in step two. The overall fit of the 
regression models can be seen in Table 14. Results of the regression can be seen in Table 
15. Collinearity diagnostics conducted during the regression indicate that 
multicollinearity for this regression is not a major concern. Tolerance scores were all 
above 0.01 with the lowest score 0.27, and VIF scores were all below 10 with a highest 
score of 3.702.  
 Overall, the research model explains 30.4% (adj. R2 = 0.167) of the variance in 
the dependent variable, computer security usage. The main effects of vulnerability, 
severity, benefits, barriers, self-efficacy, and cues to action account for 14% (adj. R2 = 
0.111) of the explained variance, while the moderating variables gender, age, education, 
prior experience, and the hypothesized two-way effects account for 16.4% (adj. R2 =  
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Table 14 
 
Regression Model Fit 
Change Statistics 
Model R R2  Adj. R2 SE Est. ΔR2  F Change df1 df2 Sig. F Change 
1 .375 .140*** .111 1.912 .140 4.814 6 177 .000 
2 .551 .304*** .167 1.851 .164 1.499 24 153 .075 
*p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001 
 
 
Table 15 
 
Hierarchical Regression 
  Coefficients   Collinearity Statistics 
Model Predictor B SE B β Sig  Tolerance VIF 
1 Vulnerability .289 .094 .226 .002**  .903 1.108 
 Severity -.002 .120 -.001 .987  .752 1.330 
 Benefits .133 .134 .075 .321  .845 1.183 
 Barriers -.221 .109 -.157 .044*  .812 1.231 
 Self-efficacy .201 .086 .171 .021*  .909 1.100 
 Cues to Action .189 .131 .114 .151  .779 1.283 
         
2 Vulnerability .182 .138 .142 .189  .390 2.561 
 Severity .081 .194 .054 .677  .270 3.702 
 Benefits .017 .189 .010 .927  .395 2.530 
 Barriers -.190 .157 -.135 .229  .362 2.762 
 Self-efficacy .279 .147 .238 .060  .289 3.464 
 Cues to Action .114 .136 .069 .403  .675 1.481 
 Gender .236 .320 .058 .461  .730 1.370 
 Age .015 .010 .122 .140  .669 1.495 
 Education .105 .098 .083 .286  .752 1.329 
 Prior Experience .361 .150 .212 .017*  .588 1.700 
 Gender*Vulnerability .077 .194 .041 .692  .425 2.353 
 Gender*Severity -.281 .255 -.134 .272  .307 3.257 
 Gender*Benefits .203 .286 .075 .480  .407 2.456 
 Gender*Barriers -.099 .220 -.047 .654  .408 2.450 
 Gender*Self-efficacy -.031 .190 -.018 .873  .345 2.897 
 Age*Vulnerability -.010 .007 -.123 .141  .656 1.524 
 Age*Severity -.004 .007 -.054 .538  .596 1.678 
 Age*Benefits -.002 .008 -.020 .795  .748 1.336 
 Age*Barriers -.016 .007 -.183 .021*  .731 1.367 
 Age*Self-efficacy -.002 .005 -.023 .773  .739 1.354 
 Education*Vulnerability -.050 .068 -.059 .466  .698 1.433 
 Education*Severity .033 .079 .034 .680  .684 1.463 
 Education*Benefits -.222 .090 -.188 .015*  .780 1.282 
 Education*Barriers .089 .068 .100 .191  .794 1.260 
 Education*Self-efficacy .084 .064 .105 .187  .720 1.389 
 Prior Experience*Vulnerability -.115 .083 -.108 .168  .753 1.328 
 Prior Experience*Severity -.299 .128 -.219 .021*  .513 1.948 
 Prior Experience*Benefits .082 .133 .054 .537  .609 1.641 
 Prior Experience*Barriers -.084 .092 -.076 .362  .664 1.505 
 Prior Experience*Self-efficacy -.202 .081 -.211 .014*  .634 1.578 
*p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01 
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0.056) of the variance in computer security usage. In the model 1 regression analysis, the 
main effects of vulnerability, severity, benefits, barriers, self-efficacy, and cues to action, 
were tested (H1-H6).  
 H1, which predicted that perceived vulnerability would be positively related to 
computer security usage, was supported (β = 0.226, p = 0.002). H2, which predicted that 
perceived severity would be positively related to computer security usage, was not 
supported (β = -0.001, p = 0.987, n.s.). H3, which predicted that perceived benefits would 
be positively related to computer security usage, was not supported (β = 0.075, p = 0.321, 
n.s.). H4, which predicted that perceived barriers would be negatively related to computer 
security usage, was supported (β = -0.157, p = 0.044). H5, which predicted that self-
efficacy with computer security would be positively related to computer security usage, 
was supported (β = 0.171, p = 0.021). H6, which predicted that cues to action would be 
positively related to computer security usage, was not supported (β = 0.114, p = 0.151, 
n.s.).  
 In model 2, the research hypotheses H7a-e, H8a-e, H9a-e, and H10a-e were tested 
along with the main effects of the moderating variables. These moderators  were not 
hypothesized to be significantly related to computer security usage.  
 Hypotheses H7a-e, which predicted that gender would have a significant 
moderating effect with vulnerability, severity, benefits, barriers, and self-efficacy were 
not supported (H7a, β = 0.041, p = 0.692, n.s.; H7b, β = -0.134, p = 0.272, n.s.; H7c, β = 
0.075, p = 0.480, n.s.; H7d, β = -0.047, p = 0.654, n.s.; H7e, β = -0.018, p = 0.873, n.s.). 
The main effect of gender on computer security usage was also non-significant (β = 
0.058, p = 0.461, n.s.). 
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 Hypotheses H8a-e, which predicted that age would have a significant moderating 
effect with vulnerability, severity, benefits, barriers, and self-efficacy, only H8d was 
supported (H8a, β = -0.123, p = 0.141, n.s.; H8b, β = -0.054, p = 0.538, n.s.; H8c, β =  
-0.020, p = 0.795, n.s.; H8d, β = -0.183, p = 0.021; H8e, β = -0.023, p = 0.773, n.s.). The 
main effect of age on computer security usage was non-significant (β = 0.122, p = 0.140, 
n.s.).  
 The interaction of age with barriers on computer security usage shows that when 
age is low (-2 SD), perceived barriers has a positive relationship with computer security 
usage. The simple slope of the line (0.146, p = 0.372, two-tailed) indicates that for each 
increase of one standard deviation (SD) in perceived barriers, computer security usage 
goes up by a corresponding score of 0.146 SD. This is not consistent with the hypothesis 
that perceived barriers is negatively related to computer security usage, however the 
significance of the simple slope indicates the effect of perceived barriers on computer 
security usage when age is low is not significant. However, when age is high (+2 SD), the 
simple slope of the line takes on a negative value (-0.563 p = 0.001, two-tailed), 
indicating that for each increase in one SD of perceived barriers, the corresponding value 
of computer security decreases by 0.563 standard deviations. This result would indicate 
that perceived barriers is more relevant for older users. The graph of the interaction 
effects of age with barriers on computer security usage can be found in Figure 17. The 
full interaction analysis for age with barriers can be found in Appendix D. 
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Figure 17. Two-way interaction of age and perceived barriers. 
 
 
 Hypotheses H9a-e, which predicted that education would have a significant 
moderating effect with vulnerability, severity, benefits, barriers, and self-efficacy, only 
H9c was supported (H9a, β = -0.059, p = 0.466, n.s.; H9b, β = 0.034, p = 0.680, n.s.; 
H9c, β = -0.188, p = 0.015; H9d, β = 0.100, p = 0.191, n.s.; H9e, β = 0.105, p = 0.187, 
n.s.). The main effect of education on computer security usage was non-significant (β = 
0.083, p = 0.286, n.s.).  
 The interaction of education with benefits on computer security usage shows that 
when education is low (-2 SD), perceived benefits has a positive relationship with 
computer security usage. The simple slope of the line (0.328 p = 0.049, two-tailed) 
indicates that for each increase of one standard deviation (SD) in perceived benefits, 
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computer security usage goes up by a corresponding score of 0.328 SD. This is consistent 
with the hypothesis that perceived benefits is positively related to computer security 
usage. However, when education is high (+2 SD), the simple slope of the line takes on a 
negative value (-0.087, p = 0.633, two-tailed), indicating that for each increase in one SD 
of perceived benefits, the corresponding value of computer security decreases by 0.087 
standard deviations. While this is not consistent with the hypothesis that perceived 
benefits is positively related to computer security usage, the significance of the slope 
indicates that the effect of benefits on computer security usage for those with higher 
education is not significant.  This result would indicate that perceived benefits is more 
relevant for those with less education. While it would be expected that higher levels of 
education would result in higher levels of perceived benefits of usage of computer 
security software, this was not indicated. This would indicate that the perceived benefits 
are of less importance to those with higher levels of education and other motivating 
factors influence adoption behavior for this group of respondents. The graph of the 
interaction effects of education with benefits on computer security usage can be found in 
Figure 18. The full interaction analysis for prior education with benefits can be found in 
Appendix E. 
 Hypotheses H10a-e, which predicted that prior experience would have a 
significant moderating effect with vulnerability, severity, benefits, barriers, and self-
efficacy, only hypotheses H10b and H10e were supported (H10a, β = -0.108, p = 0.168, 
n.s.; H10b, β = -0.219, p = 0.021, p < 0.05; H10c, β = 0.054, p = 0.537, n.s.; H10d, β =  
-0.076, p = 0.362, n.s.; H10e, β = -0.211, p = 0.014). Additionally, the main effect of  
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Figure 18. Two-way interaction of education and perceived benefits. 
 
prior experience on computer security usage was found to be significant (β = 0.212, p = 
0.017). 
 The interaction of prior experience with severity on computer security usage 
shows that when prior experience with security incidents is low (-2 SD), perceived 
severity has a positive relationship with computer security usage. The simple slope of the 
line (0.293, p = 0.08, two-tailed) indicates that for each increase of one standard deviation 
(SD) in perceived severity, computer security usage goes up by a corresponding score of 
0.293 SD. This is consistent with the hypothesis that perceived severity is positively 
related to computer security usage. However, when prior experience is high (+2 SD), the 
simple slope of the line takes on a negative value (-0.146, p = 0.46, two-tailed), indicating 
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that for each increase in one SD of perceived severity, the corresponding value of 
computer security decreases by 0.146 standard deviations. 
 While this is not consistent with the hypothesis that perceived severity is 
positively related to computer security usage, the significance of the slopes indicates that 
the effect of perceived severity on computer security usage for those with high or low 
prior experience with security incidents is not significant. The graph of the interaction 
effects of prior experience with severity on computer security usage can be found in 
Figure 19. The full interaction analysis for prior experience with severity can be found in 
Appendix F. 
 The interaction of prior experience with self-efficacy on computer security usage 
shows that when prior experience with security incidents is low (-2 SD), self-efficacy has 
a positive relationship with computer security usage. The simple slope of the line (0.363, 
p = 0.02, two-tailed) indicates that for each increase of one standard deviation (SD) in 
self-efficacy, computer security usage goes up by a corresponding score of 0.3633 SD. 
This is consistent with the hypothesis that self-efficacy is positively related to computer 
security usage. When prior experience is high (+2 SD), the simple slope of the line 
displays a non-significant positive value (0.023, p = 0.886, two-tailed), indicating that for 
each increase in one SD of perceived severity, the corresponding value of computer 
security increases by only 0.023 standard deviations. While this is consistent with the 
hypothesis that perceived self-efficacy is positively related to computer security usage, 
the significance of the slope indicates that the effect of self-efficacy on computer security 
usage is relatively flat for those with higher prior experience with computer security 
incidents.   
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Figure 19.  Two-way interaction of prior experience and perceived severity. 
 
 The effect of self-efficacy on computer security usage appears to be more relevant 
with those who have been attacked less often, less severely, and not as recently. The 
graph of the interaction effects of prior experience with self-efficacy on computer 
security usage can be found in Figure 20. The full interaction analysis for prior 
experience with self-efficacy can be found in Appendix G. 
 
Post Hoc Power Analysis 
 Overall, only 7 of 26 hypotheses were supported during the analysis of the 
research model. A post hoc power analysis using a statistical calculator provided at 
danielsoper.com was conducted using an alpha level of .05, 30 predictors in model, an R2 
of 0.304, and a sample size of 184. This analysis revealed that the power for the 
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Figure 20. Two-way interaction of prior experience and self-efficacy. 
 
regression in this research is 0.9999. This is significantly higher than the recommended 
minimum of 0.8, indicating that the sample size for testing the regression was sufficient 
to find even a small effect size (Soper, 2010). The effect size for the regression of the full 
model is a Cohen ƒ2 value of 0.437. By convention, ƒ2 effect sizes of 0.02, 0.15, and 0.35 
are termed small, medium, and large, respectively where ƒ2 = R2 / (1 - R2) (Cohen, 1988). 
This would seem to indicate that while only seven hypotheses were supported, this was 
not due to an issue with sampling power.  
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 
 This chapter examines the findings of this study in relationship to the initial 
objectives. This chapter contains three main sections; contributions to the body of 
research, limitations of this research study, and concludes with possible directions for 
future research in this area. 
 
Summary of the Study 
 
 The primary purpose of this research was to examine the adoption process of 
computer security software in the home computer environment. The current models of 
adoption used in IS research lacked perceptions of fear that could motivate an individual 
to use computer security software. When exploring this lack of fear as motivation, the 
option of adding the perceived vulnerability and perceived severity of a computer 
incident to an existing model was explored. Upon further research, the discovery of the 
Health Belief Model, which already offered these constructs in the context of 
preventative healthcare behaviors, offered an avenue of research that few had ventured. 
The use of the Health Belief Model as a framework to design a model to examine home 
user adoption of computer security provided the basis for this research.  
 This research utilized a web-based survey to test the theoretical model derived 
from the Health Belief Model. Based on the literature review, a questionnaire was 
developed and administered on-line. The survey targeted individuals who are responsible 
for the selection, installation, and maintenance of software on their home computers.  
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 The research model contains a total of 26 hypothetical relationships that were 
tested using multiple regression analysis techniques and explains 30.4% of the variance 
in computer security usage. The results demonstrate that certain constructs found in the 
Health Belief Model are more effective than others in motivating individuals to utilize 
computer security software. The results show that perceptions of vulnerability to attack 
significantly influence individuals’ use of security software (H1). The belief in the 
probability of a security incident was found to be the to be the most significant of the 
main predictors in the research model. The assertion in this research that the fear belief of 
the possibility of a security incident provided the foundation for creating the research 
model. The significance of this variable accomplishes one of the major goals of this 
research study. This was to show that individual fear beliefs can be significant 
contributors to behavior. The current IS research models lack the explicit inclusion of 
such fear beliefs. 
 Perceived barriers to implementation were found to have a significant negative 
influence on computer security usage (H4). The perceived self-efficacy in selecting, 
installing and maintaining security software was found to have an influence on security 
software usage (H5). These constructs have parallel usage in other models used in IS 
research as discussed in Chapter II. That they were found to be significant in this research 
model based on the HBM provides additional validation of their use in IS research.  
 Of the hypothesized moderating variables (gender, age, education, and prior 
attack experience), experience with prior attacks significantly influences individuals’ 
perceptions, persuades them to take precautions, and also moderates the relationships 
between perceived severity and security usage (H10b), and self-efficacy and security 
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usage (H10e). Other moderating relationships were found with age and education. It was 
found that age effectively moderates the relationship between perceived barriers and 
security software usage (H8d). While education was found to effectively moderate the 
relationship between perceived benefits and security software usage (H9c).  
 Two of the constructs in the research model were perceived severity and cues to 
action. These constructs are not found in current IS models. While not found to be 
significant predictors of computer security usage in this research, they still offer some 
possible explanations of attitude that should be discussed.  
 Perceived Severity was found to have little relationship with the dependent 
variable (β = -0.001, p = 0.987). While it was proposed that the level of severity would 
have a positive relationship with usage, this was not found. However, examination of the 
severity scores reported by respondents shows that perceived severity is important to 
users, where the majority of users reported that a security incident on their computer 
would be serious. The mean score for this variable was 5.2 on a scale of 1 to 7 with 1 
being no impact and 7 being very high impact. While the importance of this variable to 
the respondents was high, the impact of such an incident would only be realized should 
the event actually occur. This likelihood of the occurrence was modeled in the perceived 
vulnerability construct, which was shown to be a significant predictor of computer 
security usage.  
 Cues to action in this study had a higher than expected mean score of 5.05 on a 
seven point agree/disagree scale indicating that more users agreed than disagreed that 
they would be more conscious about their own security status given the cues to action 
measured. While there is no clear indication as to why this variable failed to attain 
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significance (β = 0.114, p = 0.151), the cross sectional design used in this study may 
provide a possible explanation of this variables relationship to the computer security 
usage. The respondents could agree that the measured cues to actions would make them 
more conscious of their own security status, but the usage would depend on them having 
actually experienced the cues to action. This may not be the case with respondents that 
had CUE scores that did not significantly, and positively, correlate with computer 
security usage as H6 stated. A better method of measuring this construct would be to 
determine if individuals had been exposed to one of these triggering events.   
 
Contributions 
 
 The research model tested represents the first study to apply the HBM to study 
computer security usage behavior in the home environment. The research model tested in 
this study provides empirical evidence that the constructs contained in the HBM can be 
used to examine this understudied area of computer security. The results of this research 
also suggest that further evaluation of models based on the HBM may apply in the study 
of computer security adoption in the home.  
 The testing of the model revealed the two most significant contributors to the 
usage of computer security for this study were the perceived vulnerability of a security 
incident and the prior experience with a security incident. These two constructs 
corresponded significantly with each other (Pearson’s r = .372, p < .01). This suggests 
that while both constructs are important factors in security adoption in the home, many of 
the respondents that felt vulnerable had also experienced prior security problems. This 
suggests that user education before an incident takes place could influence users 
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perceptions of vulnerability and encourage security software usage thus reducing the 
need for the influence of prior attacks to motivate security usage. 
 
Implications for Research 
 
 The HBM provides a foundation for the study of the security behavior of 
individual users that can be applied to both the home and organizational environments. 
While this study represents the first attempt to use the HBM in the home environment to 
study computer security usage, it also represents the second attempt to study individual 
security usage behavior using the HBM. The study conducted by Ng and colleagues 
(2009) was conducted in an organizational setting using email usage behavior as the 
dependent variable. Ng and colleagues (2009) found similar results with perceived 
vulnerability, perceived benefits and self-efficacy being the most significant antecedents 
of behavior. While their model explained more variance than in this study (R2 = .593 vs 
R2 = .372) the differences in the dependent variable may account for the increase in 
explained variance. Similar to this study, Ng and colleagues (2009) discovered that the 
cues to action construct was not a significant antecedent of usage behavior.  
 
Implications for Practice 
 
 The practical applications of this research are limited due to the population 
studied not being the intended audience of the study results. While from a practical 
standpoint the results may not have a significant influence on current implementation 
behavior in the home, it provides theoretical foundation for further model development 
that can help us understand how to motivate individuals to protect their computer 
systems. This motivation can take several forms. Recommendations for practice include 
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user education where possible. The education of users to the reality of the constructs 
found within the research model based on the HBM could significantly improve the 
security posture of these individual users. Through targeted messages in the media, 
classroom interaction, web based advertisements, email campaigns, and other methods of 
disseminating public service announcements (PSA), the perceptions of vulnerability, 
severity, and benefits could be increased. These messages could also be used to dispel 
perceptions of barriers to implementation and increase self-efficacy by providing 
instruction in how to properly implement computer security and maintain an update and 
effective security posture. While these ads would best be initiated by independent sources 
not tied to a commercial venture, increased advertising of the benefits of computer 
security software by software solution vendors could still be beneficial to goal of 
educating users to the realities of computer security threats.  
 
Limitations 
 
 There are few studies that can be found without limitations of some sort. The 
major limitation of this study is that the population of interest, being large and undefined, 
resulted in the use of a non-probability method of data collection in order to distribute the 
invitation to participate in the survey. Also, the anonymous nature of the data collection 
and the inability to track invitations sent and resulting responses with the snowball 
sampling method leads to the possibility of non-responder bias which is impossible to 
measure in this study.  
 Another limitation is that the study used self-reported usage as a dependent 
variable. This could result in a self-report bias in which the respondents answer the usage 
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measures in a way that would make their usage appear higher than would be measured 
through observation or experimentation. 
 And finally, the nature of the study is protecting home computers from online 
threats. The use of an online survey limits the respondent pool to those that felt 
comfortable completing the survey, creating a potential response bias. It may be possible 
that for those that did not feel comfortable completing the survey that the model fit would 
be better than observed in the results reported in Chapter V.  
 
Future Research 
 
 This research provides a foundation for a number of future studies based upon the 
results presented in Chapter V, and based on the limitations observed and other questions 
brought up during the course of the research. An obvious addition to this study would be 
a replication of the study in using different samples from the target population. There 
were many hypotheses were not supported during the analysis of the data collected. Only 
through replication will the value of these hypotheses to the research model be fully 
known. Another sampling issue that could be addressed in future studies would be 
obtaining a sample that is more representative of the target population thereby increasing 
the generalizability of results obtained. In the study by Brown and Venkatesh (2005), the 
sample was obtained through a marketing company and invitations were sent via postal 
mail. The method employed by Brown and Venkatesh was utilized in this research, 
however, the invitations were sent through email. The email campaign resulted in no 
completed surveys as was reported in Chapter IV. It is apparent that the target population 
has had significant exposure to the dangers of email threats and that email is not an 
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appropriate method to solicit research participation into a sensitive study such as 
computer security. Future researcher in this area should utilize postal invitations as it 
provides a better method to establish the initial trust in the recruitment process. 
 This study used computer security usage through the application of anti-virus, 
firewall, and anti-spyware software to evaluate the research model. However, future 
applications of the model could be extended to the behaviors involved in opening 
suspicious emails, using suspicious websites, file sharing, and other high-risk online 
activities. And finally, the application of the HBM to the study of security adoption can 
be extended beyond the home environment to study security adoption behavior in the 
corporate environment.  
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Good day:  
 
My Name is Chet Claar, a doctoral candidate at Utah State University. I am writing to 
request your help with an important project. As part of a research project at Utah State 
University’s department of Management Information Systems, we are examining home-
computer security issues by conducting a survey of home computer owners to ask about 
their experiences with computer security and the Internet. 
 
You were selected to be part of this project because you may be a computer owner that 
selects, installs, and maintains the software on your home-computer. We realize that you 
time is valuable and we would like you to just take a few minutes to participate in this 
brief web survey created by our researchers. 
 
For more information and to complete the survey online, please go to the URL below: 
 
http://www.surveyshare.com/survey/take/?sid=107660 
  
Sincerely,   
 
Chet L. Claar  
Doctoral Candidate 
Utah State University  
Department of MIS  
3515 Old Main Hill  
Logan, UT 84322‐3515  
Email:  chet.claar@aggiemail.usu.edu 
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******************************** MODEL SUMMARY ********************************* 
 
                                               R: 0.267076859 
                                        R Square: 0.071330049 
                               R Square Adjusted: 0.055852216 
                  Standard Error of the Estimate: 0.971672673 
R Square Contribution of the Interaction Term(s): 0.028513867 
 
                              RESEARCH MODEL: Y = B1X1 
                                                + B2X2 
                                                + B3X1X2 
                                                + B0 
 
                                       WHERE: Y = ZSSU 
                                             X1 = ZBAR 
                                             X2 = ZAGE 
                                             B0 = Regression constant 
 
****************************** END MODEL SUMMARY ******************************* 
 
 
 
************************** MODEL ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ************************** 
 
              Sum of       Degrees      Mean 
              Squares      of Freedom   Square       F            Significance 
              ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ 
  Regression: 13.05339897  3            4.351132992  4.608529584  0.003924818   
    Residual: 169.9466010  180          0.944147783   
       Total: 183.0000000  183           
 
********************************** END ANOVA *********************************** 
 
 
 
***************************** MODEL POWER ANALYSIS ***************************** 
 
            Effect Size (f Square): 0.076808826 
  Noncentrality Parameter (Lambda): 14.13282405 
                        Critical F: 4.608529584 
                      Noncentral F: 0.322364301 
         Beta (Type II Error Rate): 0.373588426 
                    Observed Power: 0.626411573 
 
****************************** END POWER ANALYSIS ****************************** 
 
 
 
****************************** MODEL COEFFICIENTS ****************************** 
 
                          B            Std Error    t            Significance 
                          ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ 
   (Regression constant): -0.01151595  0.071799955  -0.16038939  0.872752220   
                    ZBAR: -0.20851422  0.072117935  -2.89129502  0.004303870   
                    ZAGE: 0.048294390  0.071982015  0.670923016  0.503120131   
        Interaction term: -0.17717134  0.075363293  -2.35089708  0.019798611   
 
                          95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS 
                          Lower Bound  Upper Bound 
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                          ------------ ------------ 
   (Regression constant): -0.15318330  0.130151397 
                    ZBAR: -0.35080897  -0.06621947 
                    ZAGE: -0.09373217  0.190320959 
        Interaction term: -0.32586945  -0.02847323 
 
 
**************************** END MODEL COEFFICIENTS **************************** 
 
 
 
****************************** INTERACTION LINE 1 ****************************** 
 
                                  Moderator: ZAGE 
                     Level of the Moderator: +2 Std Dev 
                               Simple Slope: -0.56285691 
                                  Intercept: 0.085072830 
             Standard Error of Simple Slope: 0.171037120 
                         Degrees of Freedom: 180 
                                          t: -3.29084655 
  Significance of Simple Slope (two-tailed): 0.001201937 
  Significance of Simple Slope (one-tailed): 0.000600968 
 
                                             Lower Bound  Upper Bound 
                                             ------------ ------------ 
             95% CI around the Simple Slope: -0.90035263  -0.22536120 
 
********************************** END LINE 1 ********************************** 
 
 
 
****************************** INTERACTION LINE 2 ****************************** 
 
                                  Moderator: ZAGE 
                     Level of the Moderator: -2 Std Dev 
                               Simple Slope: 0.145828464 
                                  Intercept: -0.10810473 
             Standard Error of Simple Slope: 0.163050005 
                         Degrees of Freedom: 180 
                                          t: 0.894378777 
  Significance of Simple Slope (two-tailed): 0.372313595 
  Significance of Simple Slope (one-tailed): 0.186156797 
 
                                             Lower Bound  Upper Bound 
                                             ------------ ------------ 
             95% CI around the Simple Slope: -0.17590683  0.467563760 
 
********************************** END LINE 2 ********************************** 
 
 
 
**************************** DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS **************************** 
 
                          Mean       Std Dev    N          Minimum    Maximum 
                          ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- 
                    ZSSU: 0.0000000  1.0000000  184.00000  -1.853088  1.1855217 
                    ZBAR: 0.0000000  1.0000000  184.00000  -1.890322  2.2641615 
                    ZAGE: 0.0000000  1.0000000  184.00000  -1.109219  2.4631992 
        Interaction term: -0.064998  0.9549018  184.00000  -3.438482  2.5394484 
 
************************** END DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ************************** 
 
 
 
********************************* CORRELATIONS ********************************* 
 
                          ZSSU 
                          ---------------------- 
                    ZSSU: 1.000000000 
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                    ZBAR: -0.20125815 
                    ZAGE: 0.061126639 
        Interaction term: -0.15612123 
 
                          ZBAR 
                          ---------------------- 
                    ZSSU: -0.20125815 
                    ZBAR: 1.000000000 
                    ZAGE: -0.06535413 
        Interaction term: -0.06154529 
 
                          ZAGE 
                          ---------------------- 
                    ZSSU: 0.061126639 
                    ZBAR: -0.06535413 
                    ZAGE: 1.000000000 
        Interaction term: 0.004699213 
 
                          Interaction term 
                          ---------------------- 
                    ZSSU: -0.15612123 
                    ZBAR: -0.06154529 
                    ZAGE: 0.004699213 
        Interaction term: 1.000000000 
 
******************************* END CORRELATIONS ******************************* 
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******************************** MODEL SUMMARY ********************************* 
 
                                               R: 0.239395212 
                                        R Square: 0.057310067 
                               R Square Adjusted: 0.041598569 
                  Standard Error of the Estimate: 0.978979790 
R Square Contribution of the Interaction Term(s): 0.009084089 
 
                              RESEARCH MODEL: Y = B1X1 
                                                + B2X2 
                                                + B3X1X2 
                                                + B0 
 
                                       WHERE: Y = ZSSU 
                                             X1 = ZBEN 
                                             X2 = ZEDU 
                                             B0 = Regression constant 
 
****************************** END MODEL SUMMARY ******************************* 
 
 
 
************************** MODEL ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ************************** 
 
              Sum of       Degrees      Mean 
              Squares      of Freedom   Square       F            Significance 
              ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ 
  Regression: 10.48774243  3            3.495914146  3.647651217  0.013761229   
    Residual: 172.5122575  180          0.958401430   
       Total: 183.0000000  183           
 
********************************** END ANOVA *********************************** 
 
 
 
***************************** MODEL POWER ANALYSIS ***************************** 
 
            Effect Size (f Square): 0.060794186 
  Noncentrality Parameter (Lambda): 11.18613040 
                        Critical F: 3.647651217 
                      Noncentral F: 0.356060888 
         Beta (Type II Error Rate): 0.360897542 
                    Observed Power: 0.639102457 
 
****************************** END POWER ANALYSIS ****************************** 
 
 
 
****************************** MODEL COEFFICIENTS ****************************** 
 
                          B            Std Error    t            Significance 
                          ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ 
   (Regression constant): 0.017033363  0.073321023  0.232312133  0.816556610   
                    ZBEN: 0.120416538  0.073962343  1.628079011  0.105237982   
                    ZEDU: 0.162230645  0.073609853  2.203925674  0.028784093   
        Interaction term: -0.10383172  0.078838355  -1.31702044  0.189487589   
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                          95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS 
                          Lower Bound  Upper Bound 
                          ------------ ------------ 
   (Regression constant): -0.12763518  0.161701908 
                    ZBEN: -0.02551738  0.266350461 
                    ZEDU: 0.016992216  0.307469075 
        Interaction term: -0.25938643  0.051722977 
 
 
**************************** END MODEL COEFFICIENTS **************************** 
 
 
 
****************************** INTERACTION LINE 1 ****************************** 
 
                                  Moderator: ZEDU 
                     Level of the Moderator: +2 Std Dev 
                               Simple Slope: -0.08724691 
                                  Intercept: 0.341494655 
             Standard Error of Simple Slope: 0.182401393 
                         Degrees of Freedom: 180 
                                          t: -0.47832372 
  Significance of Simple Slope (two-tailed): 0.633000255 
  Significance of Simple Slope (one-tailed): 0.316500127 
 
                                             Lower Bound  Upper Bound 
                                             ------------ ------------ 
             95% CI around the Simple Slope: -0.44716696  0.272673138 
 
********************************** END LINE 1 ********************************** 
 
 
 
****************************** INTERACTION LINE 2 ****************************** 
 
                                  Moderator: ZEDU 
                     Level of the Moderator: -2 Std Dev 
                               Simple Slope: 0.328079991 
                                  Intercept: -0.30742792 
             Standard Error of Simple Slope: 0.165512774 
                         Degrees of Freedom: 180 
                                          t: 1.982203440 
  Significance of Simple Slope (two-tailed): 0.048978245 
  Significance of Simple Slope (one-tailed): 0.024489122 
 
                                             Lower Bound  Upper Bound 
                                             ------------ ------------ 
             95% CI around the Simple Slope: 0.001485082  0.654674900 
 
********************************** END LINE 2 ********************************** 
 
 
 
**************************** DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS **************************** 
 
                          Mean       Std Dev    N          Minimum    Maximum 
                          ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- 
                    ZSSU: 0.0000000  1.0000000  184.00000  -1.853088  1.1855217 
                    ZBEN: 0.0000000  1.0000000  184.00000  -3.252990  1.9573484 
                    ZEDU: 0.0000000  1.0000000  184.00000  -1.949288  3.0235935 
        Interaction term: 0.1640477  0.9269532  184.00000  -3.665707  3.1659834 
 
************************** END DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ************************** 
 
 
 
********************************* CORRELATIONS ********************************* 
 
                          ZSSU 
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                          ---------------------- 
                    ZSSU: 1.000000000 
                    ZBEN: 0.158164147 
                    ZEDU: 0.176350077 
        Interaction term: -0.10031571 
 
                          ZBEN 
                          ---------------------- 
                    ZSSU: 0.158164147 
                    ZBEN: 1.000000000 
                    ZEDU: 0.164944208 
        Interaction term: -0.11417068 
 
                          ZEDU 
                          ---------------------- 
                    ZSSU: 0.176350077 
                    ZBEN: 0.164944208 
                    ZEDU: 1.000000000 
        Interaction term: 0.059664925 
 
                          Interaction term 
                          ---------------------- 
                    ZSSU: -0.10031571 
                    ZBEN: -0.11417068 
                    ZEDU: 0.059664925 
        Interaction term: 1.000000000 
 
******************************* END CORRELATIONS ******************************* 
 
 
Total execution time: 0.1400 seconds. 
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########################### END INTERACTION ANALYSIS ########################### 
 
   129 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix F – Interaction Analyses of Prior Experience * Severity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   130 
 
 
 
 
########################## BEGIN INTERACTION ANALYSIS ########################## 
 
Saturday, September 25, 2010  7:11:38 PM 
 
Output generated by Interaction version 1.4.1903 
Download the latest version at: http://www.danielsoper.com/Interaction 
Copyright (c) 2006-2009 by Daniel S. Soper, Ph.D. All Rights Reserved. 
 
 
******************************** MODEL SUMMARY ********************************* 
 
                                               R: 0.224798458 
                                        R Square: 0.050534347 
                               R Square Adjusted: 0.034709919 
                  Standard Error of the Estimate: 0.982491771 
R Square Contribution of the Interaction Term(s): 0.009231793 
 
                              RESEARCH MODEL: Y = B1X1 
                                                + B2X2 
                                                + B3X1X2 
                                                + B0 
 
                                       WHERE: Y = ZSSU 
                                             X1 = ZSEV 
                                             X2 = ZPXP 
                                             B0 = Regression constant 
 
****************************** END MODEL SUMMARY ******************************* 
 
 
 
************************** MODEL ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ************************** 
 
              Sum of       Degrees      Mean 
              Squares      of Freedom   Square       F            Significance 
              ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ 
  Regression: 9.247785510  3            3.082595170  3.193439187  0.024870339   
    Residual: 173.7522144  180          0.965290080   
       Total: 183.0000000  183           
 
********************************** END ANOVA *********************************** 
 
 
 
***************************** MODEL POWER ANALYSIS ***************************** 
 
            Effect Size (f Square): 0.053223986 
  Noncentrality Parameter (Lambda): 9.793213507 
                        Critical F: 3.193439187 
                      Noncentral F: 0.377773822 
         Beta (Type II Error Rate): 0.352799362 
                    Observed Power: 0.647200637 
 
****************************** END POWER ANALYSIS ****************************** 
 
 
 
****************************** MODEL COEFFICIENTS ****************************** 
 
                          B            Std Error    t            Significance 
                          ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ 
   (Regression constant): 0.023656101  0.074604887  0.317085152  0.751542432   
                    ZSEV: 0.073189132  0.076319810  0.958979487  0.338841292   
                    ZPXP: 0.186706970  0.077139554  2.420379174  0.016487236   
        Interaction term: -0.10975584  0.082963675  -1.32293849  0.187515588   
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                          95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS 
                          Lower Bound  Upper Bound 
                          ------------ ------------ 
   (Regression constant): -0.12354561  0.170857816 
                    ZSEV: -0.07739627  0.223774536 
                    ZPXP: 0.034504144  0.338909796 
        Interaction term: -0.27345014  0.053938467 
 
 
**************************** END MODEL COEFFICIENTS **************************** 
 
 
 
****************************** INTERACTION LINE 1 ****************************** 
 
                                  Moderator: ZPXP 
                     Level of the Moderator: +2 Std Dev 
                               Simple Slope: -0.14632254 
                                  Intercept: 0.397070043 
             Standard Error of Simple Slope: 0.197503414 
                         Degrees of Freedom: 180 
                                          t: -0.74086084 
  Significance of Simple Slope (two-tailed): 0.459743188 
  Significance of Simple Slope (one-tailed): 0.229871594 
 
                                             Lower Bound  Upper Bound 
                                             ------------ ------------ 
             95% CI around the Simple Slope: -0.53604237  0.243397278 
 
********************************** END LINE 1 ********************************** 
 
 
 
****************************** INTERACTION LINE 2 ****************************** 
 
                                  Moderator: ZPXP 
                     Level of the Moderator: -2 Std Dev 
                               Simple Slope: 0.292700813 
                                  Intercept: -0.34975783 
             Standard Error of Simple Slope: 0.166449993 
                         Degrees of Freedom: 180 
                                          t: 1.758490986 
  Significance of Simple Slope (two-tailed): 0.080363435 
  Significance of Simple Slope (one-tailed): 0.040181717 
 
                                             Lower Bound  Upper Bound 
                                             ------------ ------------ 
             95% CI around the Simple Slope: -0.03574344  0.621145071 
 
********************************** END LINE 2 ********************************** 
 
 
 
**************************** DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS **************************** 
 
                          Mean       Std Dev    N          Minimum    Maximum 
                          ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- 
                    ZSSU: 0.0000000  1.0000000  184.00000  -1.853088  1.1855217 
                    ZSEV: 0.0000000  1.0000000  184.00000  -3.080067  1.3388379 
                    ZPXP: 0.0000000  1.0000000  184.00000  -1.344965  2.8495041 
        Interaction term: 0.2155338  0.9203401  184.00000  -2.490858  4.1425858 
 
************************** END DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ************************** 
 
 
 
********************************* CORRELATIONS ********************************* 
 
                          ZSSU 
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                          ---------------------- 
                    ZSSU: 1.000000000 
                    ZSEV: 0.130332564 
                    ZPXP: 0.180474683 
        Interaction term: -0.07226356 
 
                          ZSEV 
                          ---------------------- 
                    ZSSU: 0.130332564 
                    ZSEV: 1.000000000 
                    ZPXP: 0.216711659 
        Interaction term: -0.16514609 
 
                          ZPXP 
                          ---------------------- 
                    ZSSU: 0.180474683 
                    ZSEV: 0.216711659 
                    ZPXP: 1.000000000 
        Interaction term: 0.218717289 
 
                          Interaction term 
                          ---------------------- 
                    ZSSU: -0.07226356 
                    ZSEV: -0.16514609 
                    ZPXP: 0.218717289 
        Interaction term: 1.000000000 
 
******************************* END CORRELATIONS ******************************* 
 
 
Total execution time: 0.1400 seconds. 
 
Output generated by Interaction version 1.4.1903 
Download the latest version at: http://www.danielsoper.com/Interaction 
Copyright (c) 2006-2009 by Daniel S. Soper, Ph.D. All Rights Reserved. 
 
########################### END INTERACTION ANALYSIS ########################### 
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########################## BEGIN INTERACTION ANALYSIS ########################## 
 
Saturday, September 25, 2010  7:26:06 PM 
 
Output generated by Interaction version 1.4.1903 
Download the latest version at: http://www.danielsoper.com/Interaction 
Copyright (c) 2006-2009 by Daniel S. Soper, Ph.D. All Rights Reserved. 
 
 
******************************** MODEL SUMMARY ********************************* 
 
                                               R: 0.281857248 
                                        R Square: 0.079443508 
                               R Square Adjusted: 0.064100900 
                  Standard Error of the Estimate: 0.967418782 
R Square Contribution of the Interaction Term(s): 0.007343700 
 
                              RESEARCH MODEL: Y = B1X1 
                                                + B2X2 
                                                + B3X1X2 
                                                + B0 
 
                                       WHERE: Y = ZSSU 
                                             X1 = ZSEF 
                                             X2 = ZPXP 
                                             B0 = Regression constant 
 
****************************** END MODEL SUMMARY ******************************* 
 
 
 
************************** MODEL ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ************************** 
 
              Sum of       Degrees      Mean 
              Squares      of Freedom   Square       F            Significance 
              ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ 
  Regression: 14.53816203  3            4.846054012  5.177966314  0.001867899   
    Residual: 168.4618379  180          0.935899099   
       Total: 183.0000000  183           
 
********************************** END ANOVA *********************************** 
 
 
 
***************************** MODEL POWER ANALYSIS ***************************** 
 
            Effect Size (f Square): 0.086299438 
  Noncentrality Parameter (Lambda): 15.87909669 
                        Critical F: 5.177966314 
                      Noncentral F: 0.307558277 
         Beta (Type II Error Rate): 0.379209299 
                    Observed Power: 0.620790700 
 
****************************** END POWER ANALYSIS ****************************** 
 
 
 
****************************** MODEL COEFFICIENTS ****************************** 
 
                          B            Std Error    t            Significance 
                          ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ 
   (Regression constant): -0.00442960  0.071414792  -0.06202647  0.950609812   
                    ZSEF: 0.193212544  0.071780116  2.691727949  0.007771150   
                    ZPXP: 0.174513034  0.072908826  2.393578984  0.017701440   
        Interaction term: -0.08491909  0.070865824  -1.19830813  0.232355161   
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                          95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS 
                          Lower Bound  Upper Bound 
                          ------------ ------------ 
   (Regression constant): -0.14533699  0.136477782 
                    ZSEF: 0.051584340  0.334840748 
                    ZPXP: 0.030657790  0.318368279 
        Interaction term: -0.22474332  0.054905136 
 
 
**************************** END MODEL COEFFICIENTS **************************** 
 
 
 
****************************** INTERACTION LINE 1 ****************************** 
 
                                  Moderator: ZPXP 
                     Level of the Moderator: +2 Std Dev 
                               Simple Slope: 0.023374355 
                                  Intercept: 0.344596461 
             Standard Error of Simple Slope: 0.163190413 
                         Degrees of Freedom: 180 
                                          t: 0.143233628 
  Significance of Simple Slope (two-tailed): 0.886265888 
  Significance of Simple Slope (one-tailed): 0.443132944 
 
                                             Lower Bound  Upper Bound 
                                             ------------ ------------ 
             95% CI around the Simple Slope: -0.29863799  0.345386708 
 
********************************** END LINE 1 ********************************** 
 
 
 
****************************** INTERACTION LINE 2 ****************************** 
 
                                  Moderator: ZPXP 
                     Level of the Moderator: -2 Std Dev 
                               Simple Slope: 0.363050734 
                                  Intercept: -0.35345567 
             Standard Error of Simple Slope: 0.154432445 
                         Degrees of Freedom: 180 
                                          t: 2.350870846 
  Significance of Simple Slope (two-tailed): 0.019811964 
  Significance of Simple Slope (one-tailed): 0.009905982 
 
                                             Lower Bound  Upper Bound 
                                             ------------ ------------ 
             95% CI around the Simple Slope: 0.058319872  0.667781596 
 
********************************** END LINE 2 ********************************** 
 
 
 
**************************** DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS **************************** 
 
                          Mean       Std Dev    N          Minimum    Maximum 
                          ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- 
                    ZSSU: 0.0000000  1.0000000  184.00000  -1.853088  1.1855217 
                    ZSEF: 0.0000000  1.0000000  184.00000  -2.067610  1.4054114 
                    ZPXP: 0.0000000  1.0000000  184.00000  -1.344965  2.8495041 
        Interaction term: -0.052162  1.0291120  184.00000  -4.157157  2.6852099 
 
************************** END DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ************************** 
 
 
 
********************************* CORRELATIONS ********************************* 
 
                          ZSSU 
   136 
 
                          ---------------------- 
                    ZSSU: 1.000000000 
                    ZSEF: 0.189079123 
                    ZPXP: 0.180474683 
        Interaction term: -0.13062936 
 
                          ZSEF 
                          ---------------------- 
                    ZSSU: 0.189079123 
                    ZSEF: 1.000000000 
                    ZPXP: -0.05244772 
        Interaction term: -0.05743584 
 
                          ZPXP 
                          ---------------------- 
                    ZSSU: 0.180474683 
                    ZSEF: -0.05244772 
                    ZPXP: 1.000000000 
        Interaction term: -0.18417410 
 
                          Interaction term 
                          ---------------------- 
                    ZSSU: -0.13062936 
                    ZSEF: -0.05743584 
                    ZPXP: -0.18417410 
        Interaction term: 1.000000000 
 
******************************* END CORRELATIONS ******************************* 
 
 
Total execution time: 0.1250 seconds. 
 
Output generated by Interaction version 1.4.1903 
Download the latest version at: http://www.danielsoper.com/Interaction 
Copyright (c) 2006-2009 by Daniel S. Soper, Ph.D. All Rights Reserved. 
 
########################### END INTERACTION ANALYSIS ########################### 
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